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PREFACE
I would have to cite the five months I spent in Cork, Ireland as the
biggest motivating factor behind this paper. I knew next to nothing about
Northern Ireland before this period. Soon after my arrival in Cork, however,
I became fascinated with the socio-religious anomaly to the north of me.
Since I became a religion major at Colby, I have always been interested in
liberation theology. As I read about the poverty, injustice and violence that
pervades Northern Ireland, I was reminded of the context in which Gustavo
Gutierrez, Tissa Balasuriya, and Elsa Tamez write and live. The idea behind
my paper, that a properly worded liberation theology could change minds in
Northern Ireland, may indeed be nothing more than wishful thinking. If I
have gotten nothing else out of this long, tedious process, I have at least
expanded my knowledge in both areas.
And I could not have completed this paper without the help of the
following people: my adviser and oftentimes professor Debra Campbell; her
husband, Dean Ferm, who really sparked my interest in liberation theology
and supplied me (and the rest of the world) with much needed books on the
subject;

J. J. Lee, for his tremendous insight in Irish history; my loving

parents, Wendy and Dr. Conner Moore; my brothers, Zippy and C; Chris
Forman, for his Protestant viewpoint and his insight on the IRA; Cahal Daly,
for taking a stand and writing a truly enlightening book which made this
paper possible; and, of course, all my friends who prodded, poked, encouraged
me through this endeavor - Trace, Smitty, Sohn, Randy, Nate, HHlary, Ryan,
Josh, Bear, Pete. At the risk of sounding unscholarly, I must also thank some
of the truly amazing musicians and lyr"icists who initially molded my
emotions concerning Ireland: the Pogues, the Dublin Ramblers, Stiff Little
Fingers, Makem and Clancy, etc.

INTRODUCTION

Writing about any theology involves a certain amount of optimism.
Exposition concerning the possibilities of solving protracted political conflicts
also requires a fair amOW1t of idealism. Therefore, this paper, by its very nature,
demands a fair amount of faith from the reader. It is certainly written as theory,
but with hope and only sincere intentions. After outlining the problems of
Northern Ireland and the various factions responsible for the religo-political
stalemate, this paper will attempt to show how a new theology could bring about
change in Northern Ireland.
The first chapter supplies a brief history of Ireland. It concentrates on
events that contributed to the fonnation of the factions which dominate Northern
Ireland today. Plantation, the rise of the Ascendancy, Cromwell's incursions, the
fight for Home Rule, to name just a few, all helped set the stage for the Troubles.
I have primarily used Irish sources for this chapter. As a result the history may
be slightly different to those who learned their Irish history via British history.
The next chapter details the effects of Britain'S imposition of direct rule.
The horrible carnage of IRA bombs is the only news most Americans see of
Northern lreland. Unfortunately, British injustices in Northern Ireland, e.g.,
interment without trial, murder trials in which the judge is also the jury, cannot
be compressed into thirty second news dips. Westminster's Northern Ireland

policy has consistently been geared toward stopping Republican paramilitaries.
Extreme poverty and unemployment, and the cessation of certain civil liberties
are by-products of these indiscriminate method of anti-terrorism.

Many

Catholics and poor Protestants have become a marginalized, voiceless, but
burgeoning, minority.
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The third chapter catalogs the role that the Protestant and Catholic
churches have played in the centuries-old conflict. The British government and
hard-core Republicans can only take partial responsibility; the churches must
also accept some blame. First, the text outlines a brief history of important events

which solidified Protestant/Catholic distrust and hatred. Then, the reader is
given a glimpse of the mix of Unionism and conservative Protestantism which
dominates life in Northern Ireland. This chapter also gives a glance at the Irish
brand of Catholicism and which most Ulster Protestants perceive as intrusive and
domineering.
The next chapter brings theology into the discussion. Via the criticisms
directed at liberation theology, the text constructs a rough outline of this new
Christian voice. Can parallels be drawn between liberation theology's primary
context, the so-called Third World, and the destitution of Northern Ireland? The
second half of this chapter attempts to explain just how a liberation theology
could exist in Northern Ireland. In particular, it outlines what aspects, which
have been culled from existing liberation theologies, should be included,
excluded and/or emphasized.
This paper is not trying to concoct an abstract theology for Northern
Ireland. As scholars have pointed out, a liberation theology must be truly
indigenous. With this in mind, the fifth and final chapter deals with a specific
piece of theology. The text dissects a fairly unassuming book by a concerned
Ulsterite. Archbishop Cahal Daly's The Price of Peace champions a simple, yet
powerful theology of peace. Daly acts as a voice for the marginalized people of
Northern Ireland described in chapter two. He speaks for those who are weary
of the paramilitary crime rackets, the 'unchriStian' preachers, and the devastating
apathy of Westminster. At the very least, Cahal Daly has laid the groundwork
for a liberation theology for Northern Ireland.
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In writing about this highly sensitive topic, I have tried to remain as

objective as possible. I am well aware of the powerful connotations of words and
I have tried to use the most innocuous tenns. When writing of the area in
question, I use the term Northern Ireland, which is generally accepted by the
world community. When referring specifically to the Protestant community, I
use the expression 'Ulster,' which, I have been informed, is preferred by
Protestants in Northern Ireland.

The careful reader may notice that, in

documenting the Troubles, I squarely place the blame on Britain, Unionism, and
the religions of Northern Ireland, but that I do not directly point a finger at the
IRA. This omission should in no way be construed as Republican sympathies on
my part. Cahal Daly very thoroughly and systematically debunks all of the IRA's
claims to legitimacy. In the fifth chapter I outline Daly's logic. For me to have
supplied my own, inferior argument against the IRA would have been redundant

CHAPTER ONE
THE HISTORY BEHIND THE CONFLICT
"The history of Ireland in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries is not easy to write without evoking anachronistic parallels to
modem times,"l writes historian Michael Richter. This humble assertion can
easily be expanded and inverted; it is almost impossible to fully understand
the current situation in Northern Ireland without evoking the island's
troubled history. The current British presence is certainly not the first of its
kind. In fact, much of Ireland's history consists of recounting various foreign
invasions and the subsequent indigenous uprisings.
The first Celts arrived in Ireland some six hundred years before
Christ, and about one hundred years later, the island seems to have been a
completely Celtic country. The Celts, like the Vikings and British to follow,
helped define Irish culture. Celtic kings provided a loose structure of political
leadership. The Brehon Laws, a seemingly fair but encompassing 2 system of
justice, were the source of law and order in Ireland for centuries} In fact, the
Brehon Laws helped provide such stability that Gaelic society "remained a
series of tribal monarchies right into the Middle Ages."4 And unlike much of
Europe, Ireland was never a part of the Roman Empire.

The Celts

1Michael Richter, Medieval Ireland : The Enduring Tradition (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1988), 140.
2Historian John O'Ssirne Ranelagh claims that -[No] one was above the law.' John
O'Beirne Ranelagh, A Short History of Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), 14.

'

3Ranelagh notes in A Short History of Iceland (17) that, under these doctrinaire
laws, -divorce was allowed freely. - Ironically, today in the Republic of Ireland divorce is
illegal.
4Ranelagh, 14.

4
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managed to create the first culturally homogeneous Ireland. There was, of
course, no central leadership, but this fact has been ignored as the rule of the
Celts has been gradually romanticized over the centuries. Thus, it comes as
no surprise that during various periods of foreign occupation, calls for a
revival of Gaelic culture often went hand in hand with indigenous calls for
revolt. s Even today, the idea that Celtic culture is indigenous to Ireland
persists.6
Although Ireland escaped the influence of Roman civilization as a
whole, it was profoundly influenced by the state religion.

There "were

certainly Christians before [him]" 7 , but St. Patrick was the first known
Christian missionary on the island.

Sometime in the early fifth century

(specific dates for this period are all but non-existent), Ireland's most famous
saint was born. Ironically, Patrick was raised in England; he first carne to
Ireland as a prisoner of pirates. He escaped and eventually returned to the
island after receiving a divine vision in which a man named Victorius
brought him scores of letters from Irish folk pleading for his return. S For the
rest of his life, Patrick traveled far and wide and, according to his writings,
converted thousands of Irish people to his monastic view of Christianity.
Most other incidents attributed to hirn 9 are debatable, for he soon became a
legendary figure in Ireland.
5Uam de Paor, in his anecdotal yet insightful history, gives an intriguing discussion
of the use of Celtic myth in modern Irish revolution. Liam de Paor, Portrail of Ireland (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 43-46.
61n ponrait of Ireland (45), de Paor ootes that such thinking has largely been
abandoned in the Republic. But, in the North, Mamong the nationalist part of the population,
sentimental and romantic imagery still has the power to move:
7Tomas Cardinal O'Fiaich, -The Beginning~ of Christianinty: in The Course of Irish
History, ed. 1. W. Moody and F. X. Martin, rev. and enl. ed. (Cork, Ireland: The Mercier Press,
1984), 61.
8Ranelagh, 23.
9The most famous of which concerns Sl Patrick driving all the snakes out of Ireland.
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Other famous figures in Irish religious history soon followed.
Columba the Elder founded a pair of monastic communities, but fled to an
island off the coast of Scotland after he was condemned by a synod.1 0 St.
Finnian of Clonard compiled one of Ireland's first penitentials. Columba the
Younger, who proselytized through much of Europe during the second half
of the sixth century, might be considered a typical representative of Irish
monasticism on the Continent."l] These fOUf men placed an importance on
spiritual devotion, physical sacrifice 12 and their link with Rome. They laid
the groundwork for Ireland's unique piety.
Initially, the Irish Church, unlike Christianity on the continent, did
not have the power of the state behind it.

Monks, inspired by the

aforementioned figures, spread (their particular version of) the word of God
in Ireland. Since the time of St. Patrick, a traditional hierarch y had been in
place. But the bishops' "great number ... and the nature of their position
prevented them from developing the kind of authority wielded by bishops on
the

continent."13

Still, the monasteries' emphasis on the spiritual

sovereignty of Rome lead Richter to argue that "the Irish Church was ...
more Roman than any other regional Church."14 Such a link is difficult to
ignore. Most noticeably, Ireland never succumbed to the Reformation. And
Irish Catholicism'S fierce loyalty to Rome has helped to keep the conflict in
Northern Ireland alive.

Columba.

10The synod took place at Tailtiu, but no one is sure of the exact charges against
Richter, 54.
11 Ibid.• 68.
12lbid.• 58.

13J. C. Beckett, A Short History of Ireland. 6th ed., (London: Hutchinson
1979), 12.
14Richter, 62.

& Co.,
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Christianity, of course, brought Latin to Ireland. The introduction of
this new language, garbled with Irish at first, initiated a period of
scholasticism which began in the sixth century. Monasteries gave birth to
church schools; monks began to copy the gospels and compile biographies of
church fathers.

Thus, historical records of post-Patrick Ireland are much

more plentiful and accessible. But the Christianization of the country was not
the only reason for the increase in scholarly works and activity.

As

plundering tribes and the Black Death prowled Europe, Ireland was spared
and provided a safe haven for Christian scholars to study unharmed. IS This
proliferation of knowledge was so widespread that:
The two centuries between the death of Colum Cille [Columba the
Elder] and the beginning of the Viking raids are regarded as
Ireland's Golden Age ... At a time in which the Continent was
particularly lacking in culture, Ireland, as the country of learning,
exercised an almost magnetic attraction and possessed a wide sphere
of influence. t6
Obviously, the seventh and eighth centuries aTe looked upon fondly by Gaelic
revivalists.

Even without exaggeration, it provides evidence that counters

the image of 'thick Paddy,' the common English stereotype of the Irish as
crude and stupid. 17
The first Viking attacks on Ireland occurred at the end of the eighth
century. The natives proved quite difficult to conquer, a trait that reappears
throughout Irish history, and the Vikings never made a serious attempt to

15Ranelagh, 26.
1SRichter, 68.
17On the other hand, James Joyce (1882-1941), perhaps Ireland's most famous
author, apparently bore witness to the intellectual demise of Ireland. He saw his homeland as
"a caricature ot the serious world. No longer, Joyce argued, could an Irishman be said to live
in the Island of Sai nts and Sages.· Harold Orel. Iris h Hi sto ry aad Cull u re , ad. Haraid Orel,
(Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1976), 310.
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take the entire island. They were more selective; their encampments were
usually located near their favorite targets: monasteries replete with riches.
Thus, it was the Vikings who, as a result of their greed, founded Cork, Dublin,
Waterford, and Limerick.
Despite modern myth, historian John O'Beirne Ranelagh claims that
"the Vikings were not a purely destructive force in Irish history.n IB In fact,
the Vikings opened up Irish trade with Europe, shared their superior nautical
skills and provided Ireland with what eventually became its largest cities. It is
important to remember that Ireland was not a unified nation at the time and
the Vikings soon became another tribal faction. In fact, it was not long before
they became an integral part of Irish politics 19 , making Irish allies and
enemies. In this atmosphere of Vikings and Irishmen fighting side by side,
Brian Boro rose to power.
Brian Boru, an Irish king of the late tenth century, dominates both
Irish medieval myth and history.
very ambitious ruler.

He was, to say the least, a cunning and

Brian, with the help of a motley band of allies,

attempted to overthrow the opposition that kept him from being king of the
entire island. However, at the battle of Clontarf (1014), Brian Boru met his
maker. His contribution to Irish history is quite simple; he was the king who
attempted to rule over all Ireland. Such a figure strengthened the idealized
vision of a united, Celtic Ireland. Although others20 have come close, no one
has filled this leadership void.

1BRanelagh. 29.
19lbid.
20 Including Daniel O'Connell, certain members of the Catholic hierarchy and former
Prime Minister of the Republic Eamon de Valera.
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As the Viking raids gradually subsided, Ireland was given a brief

respite from foreign invasion. However, in 1169 Dermot Mac Murrough, the
deposed king of Leinster, landed near Wexford. In just over a year, with the
aid of several Welsh nobles, Leinster was retaken.

A year later Henry II

arrived in Ireland with the pope's blessing ostensibly to reform the Irish
Church)l

Henry stormed up the eastern coast and quickly parceled out

fiefdoms to his allies.

The irony cannot be overlooked; an English king,

acting on behalf of the pope, helped set the stage for the conflict which still
exists in Northern Ireland.
After Henry's blitzkrieg, the occupied territory of Ireland grew slowly.
By the end of the thirteenth century the English had conquered more than
seventy-five percent of Ireland. 22 During this period a new Gaelic revival
made some distinct progress, but it remained too localized; lacking both a
unifying leader and a national structure. Historian

J. F. Lydon comments on

the revival: "there was never any serious attempt made to unite Gaelic
Ireland or to bring about the downfall of the English government."23
Ultimately, Norman attempts to subdue the Irish were just as
fruitless as the Vikings' had been. Although an Irish parliament was founded
in 1264,

II

it was a parliament of and for the ruling group in Ireland"24 that

tried to segregate the Normans and Irish by legislation. Moreover, the onset
of the Hundred Years' War diverted England's attention from the slowly

21The evidence seems to suggest that Henry pulled the wool over the Pope Adrian
IV's eyes. See Brian 0' Cuiv, -Ireland in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries," in The Course of
Irish History, ed. T. W. Moody and F. X. Martin, rev. and enl. ad. (Cork, Ireland: The Mercier
Press, 1984), 108.
22Richter, 150.
23J. F. Lydon, "The Medieval English Colony," The Course of Irish History, ed. T. W.
Moody and F. X. Martin, rev. and enl. ed. (Cork. Ireland: The Mercier Press, 1984), 153.
24Ranelagh, 40.
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emerging 'Irish problem.'

"By the close of the fourteenth century, the

Nonnan-Irish had become more Irish than English."25 Richard II could feel
Ireland slipping away, but he failed in two separate military campaigns
intended to reassert the dwindling English presence. Ireland, as Lydon notes,
"was left to go its own way, the Gaelic and Anglo-Irish elements learning to
live together, until the original area [of occupation] had shrunk to the Pale,"26
i.e., Dublin and the surrounding area.
Perhaps inevitably, Ireland, led by the Anglo-Irish, became involved
in the War of the Roses.

Richard, the Duke of York, drummed up

considerable support for his cause while in exile there. The new king, Henry
VII, feeling threatened by what had become a Yorkist sanctuary, sent Sir
Edward Poynings, "a capable soldier and administrator"27, to Ireland. Henry
soon realized, however, that having an Anglo-Irish leader would be more
practical.

Thus, in 1496/ Garret More FitzGerald--despi te his Yorkist

sympathies--became the deputy of Ireland.

FitzGerald and his successors

ruled Ireland with minimal interference from England for the next thirty
eight years.
Strangely enough, the marriage of an English king became a major
turning point in Irish history. After Henry VIlJ broke with Rome (1533) over
his marriage to Ann Boleyn, the Tudor conquest of Ireland soon began.
Henry certainly had ambitious ideas; historian G. A. Hayes-McCoy claims that
he "wanted to substitute for ... the Irish population ... one class only, the

25lbid. , 41.
26Lydon, 157.
27 Art Cosgrove, -The Gaelic Resurgence and the Geraldine Supremacy: in ~
Course of Irish History. ed. T. W. Moody and F. X. Martin, rev. and enl. ed. (Cork, Ireland: The
Mercier Press, 1984), 168.

11

king's subjects, all of whom would be anglicised."28 In 1537, he was declared
the 'Supreme Head' of the Church of Ireland. Despite these claims and much
to Henry's chagrin, the Tudor Reformation barely spread beyond the Pale
during his rule.
Henry did, however, insist upon a very important piece of legislation
called the Surrender and Regrant (541). Under this law, Henry claimed all of
Ireland and then parceled it out to his most loyal subjects. 29 This law marked
the beginning of the end of an Irish-owned Ireland. During the following two
centuries, England went to great lengths in order to secure Ireland, at first,
through peaceful measures. Hayes-McCoy elaborates:
The Irish parliament of 1560 ... tried to make Ireland protestant [sic]
by legislation; but the religious conservatism of the people, the fact
that the reformed religion was associated with an alien
government, and the missionary efforts of the agen ts of the
counter-refonnation all combined to entrench catholicism [sic].3 0
Predictably, this entrenchment led to soon led to violence. Lords in the north
who were largely unaffected by the Tudors soon took notice. 31 These Ulster
Lords eventually joined together, and attempted to unite all of Gaelic Ireland
under the leadership of Hugh O'Neill.
The resulting Ulster War (1595-1603) had an apocalyptic air to it.
Hayes-McCoy contends that it "was the final contest which would decide the
future of the Gaelic institutions and would complete - or make it impossible
to complete - the Tudor conquest. lt32 The Ulster lords put up a brave, if

28G. A Hayes-McCoy, -The Tudor Conquest: in The Course of Irish History, ed.
T.
W. Moody and F. X. Martin, rev. and enl. ed. (Carl< , Ireland: The Mercier Press, 1984), 179.
29Ranelagh, 49.
30Hayes-McCoy, 181.
31 Ibid. , 184.
32lbid. • 185.
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mainly defensive, fight.

In September, 1601, when about 3,500 Spaniards

arrived in County Cork to help their fellow Catholics, it appeared as if the
tables were turning. 33 Unfortunately for those who predicted the return of an
autonomous and Gaelic Ireland, the combined Catholic forces were crushed
and the Ulster lords fled to ItalYI France and other countries.
The resulting 'flight of the Earls' led to an increased level of English
domination. Land was confiscated and native Irish were segregated, "but the
pressures on James [James I, the new Stuart king] at horne to prove that he
was not a closet Catholic himself forced a tougher line."34 The answer, for an
English aristocracy long frustrated by Ireland, was an easy one: plantation, Le.)
the establishment of communities of loyal Protestants within Ireland. And
few things stood in the way of this scheme. Many of the native Irish people
were transplanted and all were segregated from the new Protestant planters. 35
The appointment of Thomas Wentworth as lord deputy exacerbated
Catholic Ireland's disdain for the plantations.

By manipulating the Irish

parliament, Wentworth reclaimed huge tracts of land for England. The now
gaelicized 'Old English' were not trusted by the government and were treated
as Irish.

When Charles I went to war with Scotland, the government

suspected Scottish Protestants in Ulster as traitors. Ranelagh maintains that
Wentworth "did more than any other administrator to emphasize the
differences between the governors and the governed in Ireland."36 Although

33Ranelagh, 53.
34Ranelagh, 54.

'

35 Aidan Clarke, "The Colonisation of Ulster and The Rebellion of 1641" in ~
Course of Irish History, ed. T. W. Moody and F. X. Martin, rev. and enl. ed. (Cork. Ireland: The
Mercier Press. , 984). 190.
36Ranelagh, 58.
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the Long Parliament cut short Wentworth's reign-he was executed in 1640-
his ideal of a unilateral and doctrinaire control of Ireland Ii ve on.
Wentworth's departure and England's emerging Civil War set the
scene for a revolt in Ireland. But on "22 October [1641L the eve of the day
appointed, a drunken indiscretion led to discovery of the (rebels'] plan. o3 ?
Although the rebels had some success in Ulster, the 1641 Rebellion, like other
Irish risings, was more of a symbol than an actual threat to the government.
As Ranelagh reminds us, "even native Irish rebels ... accepted the theoretical

right of the British crown to rule in Ireland."38 The notion of an autonomous
Irish nation was still 150 years away.
Inevitably, the Civil War in England had repercussions in Ireland. A
large Irish faction, who rallied behind the Catholic Charles I, fought for
religious tolerance and the re-distribution of land. The English Parliament
also built up an army in Ireland, but mainly pursued the war in England.
Historian Aidan Clarke comments that it "was not until the English civil war
came to an end with the trial and execution of Charles in 1649, that events in
Ireland took a decisive turn. o39
Oliver Cromwell came to Dublin with his New Model Army in 1649.
He promptly and coldly took revenge for the Ulster planters who were killed
in the 1641 rebellion. The army destroyed two royalist garrisons and killed all
the soldiers and civilians within. In May 1650, Cromwell returned to England
and continued to attack Ireland, this time with legislation.

The Irish

parliament was abolished. More importantly, Irish landowners were severely
punished. In order to payoff debts incurred during the civil war, Cromwell
....

37 Clarke, 198.

38Ranelagh, 60.
39Clarke, 202.
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sequestered enormous tracts of land and banished all Irish land owners to
Connaught.

It comes as no surprise that Oliver Cromwell has become

perhaps the icon of Irish hatred for England.
The re-establishment of the monarchy, particularly the ascension of
Catholic James IT, offered the Irish new hope for land reform. Instead, civil
war broke out in England, and Ireland, once again, was forced to choose sides.
William of Orange stormed and quickly usurped the throne of his father-in
law. In 1689 James arrived in Kinsale with French troops and attempted to
gather Irish support.

Of course, by this time Ireland was a fragmented

country; the distrust between the Presbyterian people of Ulster and the
Catholic majority of the island was mutual.

Thus 1 James's attempt at

befriending the Ulster aristocracy ended in failure. 40
The Jacobite War reached its apex in Ireland when William of Orange
defeated James II at the river Boyne. The war dragged on until the treaty of
Limerick (1691) ended the hostilities.

On the surface, William's post-war

punishments appeared lenient, especially when compared with those of
Cromwell. Nonetheless, Limerick had far-reaching im plica hons. Ranelagh
explains why:
William's victory placed power in in Ireland firrilly in the hands of
the Anglican 'Ascendency' governing class. They were the group
with governmental experience in Ireland, and they also enjoyed the
most powerful connections with political and ecclesiastical leaders
in England. In addition, within their numbers were the richest
landlords in Ireland. 41

40The apprentice bays, who slammed shut the gates of Londonderry on James'
garrison, are still folk heros in Protestant Ufster.
41 Ranelagh, 69.
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With these men in control of

Ireland~

plans were quickly implemented.to

eliminate the Ascendancy's biggest fear: Catholicism.
The Irish parliament began to enact the Penal Laws; over the course
of twenty years, it attempted to legislate 'popery' out of existence. Catholics
were forbidden to own weapons. In 1697, all Catholic bishops were expelled
from the country. Priests had to be registered with the government. These
laws, however, were rarely enforced. More important were the statutes that
whittled away at Catholic power. Catholics with land "were required to will
their lands to all their sons equally unless one became a Church of Ireland
Anglican,"42 a cunning law which tested a family's faith and cohesion. Those
without land were effectively prevented from acquiring it. Irish wool could
be sold only to England. Moreover, Catholics were barred from holding jobs
in the government, the military or the legal profession.

"All these

restrictions bore heavily upon the gentry, and it was against them that the
penal code was really directed,"43 writes historian

J. C.

Beckett. Above all, the

Penal Laws strengthened the Ascendancy's dominance of Ireland.
Because the Ascendancy was mainly comprised of Anglicans, the
Irish parliament also wanted to hinder the success of non-conformist
Protestants.

Unwittingly, it had created a common bond, albeit a very

tenuous one, between Catholics and Ulster Protestants.
dissent were not difficult to find.

Other voices of

Jonathan Swift, the philosopher George

Berkeley and William Molyneux, an Anglican MP, all argued eloquently for
Ireland's freedom.

42lbid. , 70.
43Beckett, 93.
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Soon thereafter, other factors contributed to this cry for freedom.
"The war of American independence profoundly and dramatically influenced
Irish politics,"« claims historian R. B. McDowell. Irish regiments departed for
America and left the island almost defenseless. Irishmen, who could easily
sympathize with the American colonists, were influenced by their
revolutionary ideas. The Irish Volunteers were supposed to defend Ireland
against French invasion, but they also pressured Westminster for reforrn. 45
To appease both the Presbyterian and Catholic Irish, several Penal Laws were
repealed. These concessions were not enough, however; the air of revolution
at the time gave birth to an Irish nationalist movement led by Theobald
Wolfe Tone. His group, the United· Irishmen, inspired the many nationalist
factions to follow. 46
A rebellious Ireland worried England's prime minister, William Pitt
the younger. So, in 1793, land-owning Catholics were granted the right to
vote, but the Catholic Relief Act did little

to

appease Ireland's revolutionaries.

As France prepared to wage war with England, Wolfe Tone plotted against the

government. The rebellion of 1798 was, once again, a failure; but it "had one
important consequence. It demonstrated unmistakably that Ireland presented
an urgent political problem."47
England's answer to this problem was a fairly ambitious one: Union.
On 1 January 1801, Ireland became a part of the United Kingdom. Because the

44R. B. McDowell, "The Protestant Nation," in The Course of Irish His!ory, ed. T. W.
Moody and F. X. Martin, rev. and enl. ed, (Cork. Ireland: The Mercier Press, 1984), 232.
45RaneJagh, 81.
46lbid. ,85. For a detailed discussion of the various Irish independence movements
see Tom Garvin. The Eyolution of Irish Nationalist politics (New York: Holmes & Meier, 19B1)
and Garvin Nationalist Reyolutiooaries in Ireland 1858 -1928 (Oxford. England: Clarendon
Press, 1987).
47McDowell, 245.

17

Ascendancy so opposed the Act of Union, the English government bribed the
Irish parliament with an amazing sum of money.

At first/ the effects of

Union seemed superficial. Westminster absorbed the Irish parliament and
the two established churches became one. Free trade between the two islands
was established. Plans were made for a merger of the two economies. It soon
became apparent, however/ that the Act of Union was a cosmetic solution; it
would only exacerbate the 'Irish problem.'
Feelings of unrest smoldered, only to flare up two years after Union
when an angry mob led by the eloquent idealist Robert Emmet attacked
Dublin Castle. Daniel O'Connell/ a figure who dominates nineteenth-century
Irish history, took a much less violent approach than Emmet. His main goal
was Catholic emancipation:

allowing Catholics to hold political office.

O'Connell believed that emancipation/ achieved by peaceful means, would
directly lead to the repeal of the Act of Union.
Until this point/ the general public and the Catholic Church had
denounced Irish nationalism. Now they rallied behind O'Connell. In 1829,
the newly unified parliament reluctantly passed a Catholic emancipation bill.
But it was hardly a landmark piece of legislation. The strict qualifications
allowed only a tiny minority of Catholics to hold office. But there was a more
important result: "Roman Catholics were organized in a formidable political
movement." 48 Today, the Church's hierarchy still exerts a strong influence in
the Republic of Ireland's politics.
This growing feeling of nationalism/ however, was dampened and
delayed by the arrival of the potato blight. Starvation and disease swept across

48 0. G. Boyce. The Irish Questioo and British Politics (New York: 81. Martio's Press,

1986), 4.
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the island. The great famine, which lasted from 1845 to 1849, sent much of
the rural population to Ireland's cities, America or the grave. Government
relief and volunteer programs lessened the blow, but the famine had
absolutely devastating effects on Ireland, where potatoes were the main
source of sustenance. From 1845 to 1851, the population of the island shrunk
by more than 4 million. 49 Since this period, there has been a steady stream of
emigration from Ireland.
Reflecting on this period, Ranelagh notes that "Irish emigrants
carried [a] significant effect of the famine abroad: their hatred of Britain.
Britain was blamed for the famine."so This resentment manifested itself in
the Irish people on both sides of the Atlantic.

The creation of the Irish

Republican Brotherhood (IRB) ushered in the era of Fenianism. The Fenians,
asserts Irish historian T. W. Moody, "believed that Britain would never
concede independence except to physical force."51

This philosophy, which

went a step further than O'Connell's populism, quickly drew sharp criticism
from the Catholic Church. The Fenians were not only a secret society and
therefore forbidden by Rome, they also had violent intentions and resented
the Church's encroachment on the state. 52

Nevertheless, Fenianism

remained quite papillar with the Catholic peasantry.
Of course, Fenianism did little to improve Anglo-Irish relations.
After a farcical rebeUion in 1867, attempts to release jailed Fenian leaders
resulted in the deaths of several prison guards. The "Fenians became firmly
4ge. E. R. Green. "The Great Famine,- in The CQurse of Irish History, ed. T. W. Moody
and F. X. Martin, rev. and anI. ed. (Cork, Ireland: The Mercier Press. 1984), 274.
50Ranelagh, 119.
....
51 T. W. Moody, -Fenianism, Home Rule and the Land War: in The Course of Irish
Histol)'. ed. T. W. Moody and F. X. Martin, rev. and enl. ed. (Cork , Ireland: The Mercier Press,
1984), 278.
52Jbid. , 279.
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established in British minds as odious murderers and terrorists."53 In 1867
three Fenians were hanged in Manchester after a somewhat dubious
conviction. Over a century later, the animosities still exist. The 'Manchester
Martyrs' were a precursor to the Birmingham Six, Fenian bombs foretold the
terrorism of the Provisional IRA.
This turn toward violence prompted a call for moderation. Issac Butt,

an industrious Irish MP, revived the spirit of O'Connell when he promoted a
practical Home Rule proposal. During his tenure 0870-79) the Church of
Ireland was disestablished. Moreover, the "land act of 1870 marked the first
attempt of the British parliament to intervene in the land question on the
side of the tenants. "54

Although some Irish MP's viewed Butt as too

conciliatory, his goal lived on. After 1877, Charles Parnell emerged as the
leading Irish proponent of Home Rule. He soon developed the Irish MPs
into a unified political machine.
Meanwhile, Catholic peasants were less concerned with Irish
autonomy than immediate and substantial land reform. A solid majority of
Ireland's land was owned by a handful of aristocrats. Exorbitant rents and
unjust evictions were commonplace.

The tenants decided to fight back.

Moody calls "the so-called land war of 1879-82 . . . the greatest mass
movement of modern Ireland."S5 Led by the powerful Land League, agrarian
agitators used boycotts and, quite often, outright violence to sway the
opinions of land owners.

53Ranelagh, 123.
54Moody. 281.
55lbid. , 286.

Prime Minister Gladstone helped pass a bill to
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appease the Land League. 56 Rents were significantly lowered and selling land
became a more viable option for landowners.
Able to concentrate again on Home Rule, Parnell, with the support of
Gladstone, seemed to be making progress in Westminster. Unfortunately, in
1890 the leader of the Irish MPs found himself involved in a particularly
messy divorce case. Of course, politicians of Parnell's era had to exercise a
prudent morality, especially with the Catholic (and Protestant) clergy peering
over their shoulders. The Irish Parliamentary Party split over Parnell's 'fall,'
and it would be some time before a unified Irish party could again influence
Ireland's destiny in Westminster.
The arduous process of achieving constitutional Home Rule began to
frustrate many.

In an attempt to emphasize Ireland's cultural autonomy,

another Gaelic revival began to take shape.

Formed in 1893, the Gaelic

League "was dedicated to the cultivation and revival of the Irish language
and tradition."57

The Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) was formed to

promote truly Irish sports such as hurling and Gaelic football. Essentially, the
movement was another manifestation of what Gaelic League co-founder
Douglas Hyde called 'de-anglicisation'; the GAA was a revolt against British
sports (e.g.- cricket). Later, it also served as a front for more subversive and
violent organizations.
This search for Irish roots gave birth to a different kind of political
movement. Arthur Griffith, an enterprising Fenian, believed that the Act of
Union was illegal and consequently, any manifestation of the United
Kingdom government in Ireland was illegal. Irish MPs were viewed with
"
56lbid.• 288.
57 Garvin, The Eyolutioo of Irish Nationalist politics, 100.
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distrust. In short, Griffith and the political party he formed, Sinn Fein, saw
the creation of a provisional Irish government as the catalyst to Horne Rule.
Since 1900, the Irish party in parliament had been re-united under the
leadership of John Redmond. As these constitutionalists were narrowing in
on their elusive goal, more radical elements were emerging all over the
country.

The Irish Republican Brotherhood, which "by the turn of the

century ... had lost much of its sense of purpose/58 appealed to those who
were frustrated with the snail's pace of constitutional politics.

Sinn Fein

eventually became inclined to violence (and began to resemble modern-day
Sinn Fein, which has very close ties with the Provisional IRA). Up north,
Edward Carson formed a quasi-army, the 'Ulster Volunteer Force,' to fight for
retention of the union. But, by this time (1913), Home Rule appeared to be
inevitable. As Ranelagh reports:
In 1912 [British Prime Minister] Asquith introduced the Liberal
Party's third Horne Rule Bill ... [It] was passed three times by the
commons in 1912, 1913, and 1914, and each time it was rejected by
the lords. Nevertheless, as required by the Parliament Act, the Bill
automatically became law in 191459
Unfortunately for Ireland, the United Kingdom declared war on Germany
and the institution of Home Rule was delayed.
This delay proved to be the catalyst for an amazing chain of events.
Although the majority of the Irish people backed Britain in the waf, "the
small minority of separatists - republicans [sicL socialists, Sinn Feiners - ...
became more and more convinced that the war offered an opportunity for
successful rebellion."60 This loose coalition of anti-British groups attempted
58Ranelagh. 170.
59 Ibid. , 162.

60 Beckett,

151.
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to take over the Dublin government in Ireland's most famous rebellion: the
1916 Easter Rising. The rising failed.

It did, however, manage to enrage

British public opinion and fling Ireland into chaos.
Sinn Fein soon emerged as the dominant political force in Ireland.
Dail Eireann, the independent Irish parliament created by Sinn Fein,
aggravated Westminster and provoked Protestant U1ster into taking up arms.
Conflict was inevitable. Just as the devastation of World War I horrified the
world, the Anglo-Irish War, which began in 1919, marked the nadir of Anglo
Irish relations. Historian Donal McCartney observes that:
It was a struggle characterized by guerrilla warfare, ambushes, raids

on police barracks and planned assassinations on one side; and
reprisals, the shooting-up and burning-up of towns, executions and
terrorizing on the other. 61
The British public, obviously weary of war, demanded an end to the violence.
Lloyd George responded with the Government of Ireland Act (1920). The Act
partitioned the island into two entities: the Free State of Ireland (which, in
fact, was a dominion of the United Kingdom) and the province of Northern
Ireland.
The Act did little to quell violence in either state.

Hard-line

Republicans disliked the Free-State idea and the South plunged into civil war
over the details of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. In newly formed Northern Ireland,
sectarian riots broke out almost at once and hundreds of people died. The
Government of Ireland Act did accomplish one thing: England was no longer

directly involved in the Irish Problem.

"
61 Donal McCartney. "From Parnell to Pearse: in The Course of Irish History. ed. T.
W. Moody and F. X. Martin. rev. and enl. ed. (Cork. Ireland: The Mercier Press, 1984), 311.
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REPERCUSSIONS OF HISTORY

Certain characteristics of the island's history can still be found in
Northern Ireland.
subsided.

England's imperialistic attitude toward Ireland has not

The imposition of 'direct rule; which placed Westminster in

control of Northern Ireland's destiny, reminds one of Thomas Wentworth's
unilateral policy decisions.

Like the planters of the seventeenth century,

Ulster Protestants continue to be segregated from Catholics. Gerrymandering,
direct rule, and other measures that rob Catholics of their political voice could
be considered de facto penal laws. Henry II's troops arrived in Ireland with
the best of intentions, and so did the British Army in 1969. But the army has
long since abandoned its peace-keeping role; now its primary goal is the
repression of all Republican paramilitary elements. In the 1980's, Margaret
Thatcher's intransigence toward Northern Ireland, particularly her
callousness towards the IRA hunger strikers, mimicked the calculating
coldness of Oliver Cromwell.
Protestant Ulster also perpetuates Ireland's history of hatred.
Although it did not end Irish resistance, the Battle of the Boyne has taken on
mythical importance. Because it symbolizes a Loyalist, Protestant defeat of
Irish Catholicism, the commemoration of the battle is perhaps the most
important day of the year in Protestant lister. Flagrantly courting conflict,
planners of the festivities often re-route their parades through distinctly
Catholic areas. In Ulster, the 'Ascendancy' is still in control. Groups with
strong historical roots like the Orange Order~ a quasi-religious fraternal
organization, make sure that the political and economic status quo is
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maintained. Preachers like Ian Paisley still warn of the evils of the papacy
and reiterate the inherent superiority of Protestantism.
Republicans in Northern Ireland! those who still desire a united and
autonomous Ireland, are also guilty of manipulating the past.

Like the

participants in earlier, unsuccessful Irish rebellions! the IRA continues its
hopeless struggle. The Catholic Church has strongly condemned their actions
and, because of their increasing involvement in extortion and larceny, many
Catholics in Northern Ireland have put their faith in const itu tional politics.
Only blind idealism and irreconcilable hatred of the British propel the
Republican cause.
In conclusion, few people have learned anything but hate from
Anglo-Irish history. This fact is hardly surprising; Ireland's history is one of
invasions! uprisings, repression and lingering bitterness.

A few times,

Catholics and Protestants did share a sense of solidarity, but only in the face of
politically motivated Anglican repression. Therefore peace movements will
gain nothing by attempting to re-interpret Ireland's history. The key to any
ecumenical movement is forgiving the past while, at the same time,
emphasizing the common ground between the two sides.

"

CHAPTER TWO
INJUSTICE AND POVERTY

PRODUCTS OF THE TROUBLES

The problems of Northern Ireland involve more than politically
fueled violence.

The province is also being ravaged by poverty and

intolerance, as well as an autocratic judicial system and police force. While
not fully responsible for the current situation (commonly referred to as the
Troubles), Britain has robbed Northern Ireland of its autonomy but failed to
treat all Uisterites fairly. This chapter will demonstrate that Britain, despite
the imposition of direct rule, has done little to solve a violent conflict which,
technically, is taking place within its borders. In the 'political backwater' of
Northern Ireland, Catholics, poor Protestants and suspected paramilitaries are
the victims of Britain's apathy. For this reason alone, the various religious
denominations of Northern Ireland should intervene in the crisis.
Finding a long lasting. fair and practical solution for the problems of
Northern Ireland has never been at the forefront of Britain's political agenda.
Nevertheless, in the wake of a new IRA bombing spree, the problem is finally
being discussed again. On 11 February 1992, British Prime Minister John
Major met with Unionist leaders Ian Paisley and James Molyneux, John
Hume of the SDLP (the Social and Democratic Labour Party, a non-violent
Nationalist party), and John Alderice of the non-partisan Alliance Party. That
this event was "the first time in 16 years that a British premier has met with
the political leaders of Northern Ireland'"
government's ability to ignore Ulster problem.

demonstrates the British
Unfortunately, even this

1Kevin Cullen, "Major Resists Call For N. Ireland Sweep,' The Basion Globe. , 2
February 1992. 2.
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quotation is misleading. Major met with only four of the many leaders of
Northern Ireland. To no one's surprise, Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams
did not receive an invitation to 10 Downing Street.
Sinn Fein is not the most popular political party among Nationalists
in Northern Ireland, but it receives a significant amount of the vote. In no
uncertain tenns, it advocates the creation of a completely united socialist Irish
state and the use of any means necessary to achieve this end. Thus, Sinn Fein
has undeniable ties to the Provisional IRA. Conservative British elements
consider Sinn Fein the 'mouthpiece for the IRA.'

Because of its link to

violent organizations, Sinn Fein has been denied access to any

serious

negotiations or talks. However, connections between hard-core Unionists,
including the Reverend Ian Paisley, and loyalist paramilitaries have been
well documented. 2 Because of such a double standard, many Catholics feel
alienated and have little faith in the talks.
At the aforementioned meeting on 11 February, "Molyneux and
Paisley expressed their support for internment--imprisonment without
charge or triaJ."3 Such a seemingly desperate political maneuver may sound
like the trappings of a police-state, but internment is nothing new to
Northern Ireland. In fact, if some had their way, Belfast would soon resemble
the West Bank: "hard-line unionists, including Paisley, have called for
sealing off Catholic areas and instituting identification cards."4 Sadly, these
suggestions only scratch the surface of the tremendous injustices and wrong

2See Steve Bruce, God Save Ulster; The Religioo and politjcs of pajsleyjsm (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 79, 142. Ed MoI0'fl9Y and Andy Pollak, pajs I ey (Dublin;
Pootbeg Press, 1985),292. 366-389. David McKinrick, Despatches from Belfast (Belfast: The
Blackstaff Press, 1989), 96.
3Cullen.
4lbid.
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doings that have occurred in Northern Ireland since the onset of the
Troubles.

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL WAR

In 1967 Catholics (and some Protestants) who were upset with
Unionism's political stranglehold on the government formed the Northern
Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). Largely based on the precepts of
Martin Luther King, NICRA developed a list of demands: universal suffrage,
fair housing and an end to gerrymandering and job discrimination.

Soon

after its {ormation, NICRA was receiving heavy criticism from Loyalist
factions. It was beginning to be viewed as nothing more than a front for IRA.
Ironically, the Protestant backlash caused by these fears awoke the IRA from
its politically dormant state. s After several civil rights marches turned ugly,
the IRA began to recruit members and protect Catholic neighborhoods.
Angry Loyalists who were frustrated by the government's cow-towing to
Catholics banded together and produced a response to the now burgeoning
IRA: the paramilitary Ulster Defense Association (UDA).

Tensions soon

exploded; the British Army, which had been sent to Northern Ireland as a
peace-keeping force and was "welcomed like a liberating army"6 in
Nationalist areas, found itself at war with the IRA.

Just how much

interaction occurred between civil rights leaders and rRA terrorists during the

Sin 1970. the IRA split into two factions 'which engaged in a turf war for several
years afterward. The Provisional IRA (or PIRA) still pursues an agenda of violence. The
Official IRA turned to constitutional politics and eventually became the Workers' Party.
6Taylor Downing ed., The Troubles, rev. ad. (London: Thames MacDonald, 1980).
150.

28

initial stages of the Troubles is very suspect. In the eyes of many Protestants,
however, the two were synonymous.
Those in power (who were and still are disproportionately Protestant)
viewed the incarceration of IRA leaders as the most expedient and efficient
solution to sectarian violence. Sporadic incursions into hard-core Nationalist
areas of Belfast put some of them behind bars. The biggest operation, the
commemoration of which is still cause for celebratory riots in Republican
communities, occurred on 9 August 1971. Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden
(law professors from both sides of the Irish border) and Colm Campbell (a
lawyer) extensively researched the events of this night. They reported that:
there were immediate and widespread complaints about the
discriminatory use of internment against Republicans, about the
failure to distinguish between involvement in political campaigns
and involvement in political activity and involvement in violent
activity, and about the systematic ill-treatment of suspects during
the initial arrest operation. Of particular concern was the use of the
so-called 'five techniques' - wall-standing, hooding, continuous
noise, deprivation of food and deprivation of sleep - which were
used on some of the subjects during prolonged interrogation.?
It is important to note that many Loyalist paramilitaries were also taken into

custody in August of 1971.

And, almost certainly, some of them had to

endure 'the five techniques.'

The central thrust of the operation, however,

was aimed at the IRA.

The Unionists underestimated the Catholic

community's reaction to this 'draconian measure.'s Martyrs act as recruiting
spokesmen for groups like the IRA. Internment only helped the Republican
cause; those arrested were soon replaced with eager recruits. It also helped to

7Tom Hadden, Kevin Boyle and Colm Campb6I1, "Emergency law in Nonhern Ireland:
The Context: in Juslice Under Fire ; The Abuse of Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland, ad.
Anthony Jennings, 2d ed. (london: Pluto Press, 1990), 6.
BDowning, 158.
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further polarize Catholics
violence.

and Protestants by heightening the level of

The events of 9 August "caused an immediate and violent

response: 22 people died in the riots of the next four days." 9
On 30 August 1972, or 'Bloody Sunday,' the violence in Ulster took on
international importance. 10 Thirteen people were killed as British soldiers
attempted to break up a banned civil rights demonstration.

Like all such

tragedies, there exist vastly conflicting stories about what actually happened.
The paratroopers insisted that the crowd consisted mainly of IRA terrorists
and sympathizers, and not civil rights marchers.

A public enquiry was

ordered, but the results satisfied no one. Lord Widgery, who presided over
the enquiry, finally detennined that some of the "firing bordered on the
reckless" 11 : rather mild language when the report mentions elsewhere that
one soldier was found to have fired nineteen unnecessary rounds.
Liz Curtis, who has carefully studied media bias in Northern Ireland

felt that Widgery, like many of the British newspapers, "gave far more
credence to army evidence than to evidence from other sources."1

2

Although Widgery also stated that none of the deceased had been using
weapons at the

ti~e

of their death, he concluded that "there is a strong

suspicion that some [of the deceased] had been firing weapons or handling
bombs."13 Just enough of suspicion was injected into Widgery's report that
"no prosecutions [of soldiers] were initiated, although compensation was paid

9lbid.

10 Although this chapter primarily deals with 8ritish injustice, ona cannot overlook
the horrible carnage of 'Bloody Friday.' On 21 July 1972, a series of IRA bombs killed nine
people and injured 130 in downtown Belfast. J. H. '4'hyte. The Course of Irish History, ad. T.
w. Moody and F. X. Martin. rev. and enl. ad. (Cork, Ireland: The Mercier Press, 1984),347.
11 Downing, 163.
12Uz Curtis, Ireland ; The Propaganda War (London: Pluto Press, 1984), 49.
13Downing, 163.
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to a substantial number of those affected:' 14 Still, the "state's failure to
prosecute ... marked a watershed in the Nationalist community's attitude to
the security forces."15
The Unionist government came under heavy international criticism
for the events of Bloody Sunday, but it refused to make any substantial
changes to the justice system. Quickly, the British government stepped in
and imposed 'direct rule'; in one fell swoop, Northern Ireland lost all of its
autonomy. The government "immediately appointed a committee chaired by
Lord Diplock to review all aspects of security and law policy."16 This move
might have been the biggest factor in the corrosion of the system of justice in
Northern Ireland after the implementation of direct rule.
In an effort to be fair, the ensuing report admitted that not only
Republicans, but also Loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for the
Troubles. This fact led to the most notorious result of the report. According
to Hadden, Boyle and Campbell, the committee, chaired by Lord Diplock:
recommended the suspension of jury trial for 'terrorist offences' on
the grounds that in a number of recent cases largely Protestant
juries had brought in perverse acquittals in cases against loyalist
paramilitaries. 17

14Hadden. Boyle, and Campbell. 6.
15Anthony Jennings, ·Shoot to Kill: The Final Courts of Justice: in Justice Under
Eire: The Abuse of CiYil Liberties in Northern Ireland. ed. Anthony Jennings. 2d ed. (London:
PIU10 Press. 1990), 123.
16Hadden, Boyte and Campbell, 7.
17lbid.

31

These acquittals have been eliminated, but judicial travesty lives on. Since
their implementation, the so-called Diplock courts have been responsible for
some very perverse convictions of IRA, UDA, INLA and UVF18 members.
The nadir of Northern Irish justice came in the mid-1980's with the
dawn of the 'Supergrass trials.' Grass is slang for an informant, a 'supergrass'
is an informer who rats on an entire organization in return for diplomatic

immunity. The euphemism is 'turning Queen's evidence:

Critics say the

use of supergrasses was a system carefully planned by the security forces.
Regardless of its source, the use of supergrass witnesses "was a method of
securing the prosecution and conviction of large numbers of allegedly key
members of paramilitary organizations."19 To their credit, the supergrass
trials were overwhelmingly efficient; the courts can boast of a 54% conviction
rate. 20 And, on the surface, the trials seemed more just than the policy of
in ternment.
In actuality, the Supergrass Trials circumvented Britain's traditional

notion of justice.

Over a quarter of the defendants (64 out of 223) were

convicted on nothing but the uncorroborated testimony of the supergrass. 21
More often than not, the supergrass had been ostracized by his paramilitary
group before cooperating with the government. One must keep in mind that
the convictions and sentences were handed down by the same person, usually
a white Protestant, and always male. Questions have arisen concerning the

18The last two acronyms stand for the Irish National Liberation Army, a Republican
terrorist group which is substantially smaller than the IRA but still quite active and violent,
and the Ulster Volunteer Force, a proscribed Loyalist paramilitary group.
19Steven Greer, -The Supergrass System:" in JUstice Under Fire . The Abuse of
Ciyil Liberties In Northern Ireland, ed. Anthony Jennings, 2d ed. (London: Pluto Press, 1990),
73.
20lbid., 75.

21 Ibid. , 75.
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whereabouts of, and benefits received by, certain supergrasses.

It is widely

accepted, however, that the defendants involved were not choir boys; only
the most narrow-minded Republican or Loyalist would argue that those put
away by supergrasses had not broken at least one law, i.e., being members of a
proscribed organization. Fortunately, many of these convictions were
overturned by appeals and the supergrass trial appears to be a thing of the
past. The Diplock courts, sadly, live on. Law lecturer Steven Greer notes that
even those who had their supergrass convictions overturned were taken out
Jl

of circulation by what was effectively an executive decision."22 And all the
defendants involved spent a tremendous amount of pre-trial time in the
state's custody.
Internment and Diplock courts are the most glaring deficiencies of
Northern Ireland's justice system, but the conduct of the Army and the RUe
(the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the state's predominantly Protestant police
force) has also been questioned extensively. Army harassment of Nationalists
is considered part of the starus quo in Catholic strongholds in Derry and
Belfast. 23

Private Ian Thain, the only British soldier to be convicted of

murder while on patrol,24 was given a life sentence but served only three
years.

In comparison, sixteen UDR members have been found guilty of

murdering Catholics 25 , a fact that demonstrates not only the inherent

221bld. , 91.
23For example, soldiers are allowed to 'P-check' any person; i.e.- ask one his or her
name, address. destination and place of departure. Although a helpful tool for the Army and the
RUe, the P-check is sometimes used as a stepping otf point for the harassment, physical abuse,
and/or arrest of a 'suspect.'
24Anthony Jennings, ·Shoot to Kill: The Pinal Courts of Justice: in Justice Under
Fire; The Abuse of Civil Uberties jn Northern Ireland. ed. Anthony Jennings, 2d ed. (London:
Pluto Press, 1990). 121.
25Anthony Jennings, preface to Justice UDder fire: The Abuse of Civil Liberties in
Northern Ireland, ed. Anthony Jennings, 2d ed. (london: Pluto Press, 1990). xxvii.
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sectarian nature of the UDR but also the tacit immunity that is granted to
British soldiers. Sixteen people have been killed by security forces' plastic and

rubber bullets. 26

During the 1980's, a protracted investigation into several

incidents involving seemingly trigger-happy soldiers, the so-called 'shoot to
kill' policy of the security forces, ended abruptly. The chief investigator, John

Stalker, received only stone-walling from the RUe and eventually quit out of
frustration. 27

THE ECONOMICS OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S CONFLICT

With a nearly constant level of violence and a skewed system of
justice, it is easy to overlook the other problems of Northern Ireland.

In

particular, the economy is a shambles. Given the turmoil, such a situation is
to be expected.

Unfortunately,

Northern Ireland's economic woes only

exacerbate the political deadlock.

Poverty and unemployment rates,

particularly among the working class, are substantially higher than in
England, Scotland and Wales. Meanwhile, wages are lower and the cost of
living is higher than Britain. Food costs about 8% mOTe, "electricity costs 20%
more and gas more than double the national average." 28 Moreover, low-rent
urban housing in Northern Ireland, although available, is among the worst
in Western Europe. 29

26See Anthony Jennings, MBullets above the Law: in Justice Under Fire: The Abuse
'of Ciyil Libertjes jn Northero Ireland. ad. Anthony Jennings, 2d ed. (London: Pluto Press,
1990),131·143.
27 Not surprisingly, the only detailed accou'ht of this investigation was wrilten by
Stalker himself. John Stalker, The Stalker Affajr (New York: Viking Penguin Ltd.. 1988).
28 Downing, 191.
29Uam O'Dowd and Bill Rolston and Mike Tomlinson, Northern Ireland: Between Civil
Bights and Civil War (london: CSE Books, 1980), 119.
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The working class as a whole suffers, but the brunt of these destitute
conditions falls flatly on the Catholic community. Sectarian discrimination is
illegal, but it lives on and continues to demoralize Catholics. 30 The
unemployment figures seem to back up this assertion. The unemployment
rate for Catholic males is usually twice that of Protestant males; in Catholic
slums, the number hovers over 50%. This means that the unemployment
rate of Catholic males in Northern Ireland is almost always higher than that
of any ethnic minority in Britain.

Westminster's supposed cure, huge

welfare payments, does little to alleviate this problem. In fact, it only keeps
Catholic unemployment rates at an inflated level and perpetuates the
Protestant stereotype of Catholics as lazy and unmotivated welfare sponges.
Moreover, the gap between Catholic and Protestant unemployment has
consistently risen since the Troubles began. This is not to say that Catholics
employers do not discriminate against Protestant workers, but, it is a matter of
fact that an overwhelming majority of employers are Protestants.

Quite

simply, the religion of those in power of Ulster has not changed since the days
of Plantation.
Almost all schools are segregated, and the Catholic educational
system is woefully inadequate. As a result, Catholics are considerably less
educated than Protestants and their job opportunities are limited. Economists
Bob Rowthom and Naomi Wayne report that "Catholics who do have jobs
are crowded into low-paid, insecure fOTIns of employment."31 Certain good
paying jobs are simply not available to Catholics. For example, jobs in the
security forces pay well, but the RUC remains approximately 90% Protestant.

30Downing, 191.
31 Bob Rowthorn and Naomi Wayne, Northern Ireland
Conflict (Boulder. CO: Westview Press, 1988), 119.

The Political Economy of
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As of 1979, the auxiliary UDR (Ulster Defense Regiment) was 98%
Protestant. 32 This is largely due to the fact that Catholics who join up are
asking for harassment on the job and off. Catholics in the security forces who
live in hard-core Nationalist areas are risking their lives. At the onset of the
Troubles, a vicious cycle was created; the Protestant security forces arrested
and harassed. Catholics, and Catholics, seeing the forces as the enemy, refused
to join up.
The pattern is part of an even more frightening cycle. The security
forces have become an integral part of Northern Ireland's economy. They
employ nearly one out of every ten male Protestants. 33 This means that the
Troubles provide a sort of job security.

One despondent Ulster laborer

admitted: "'There are an awful lot of people who try their best not to have the
Troubles stop. They're makin' too much personal profit out of

it'''34

Law

lecturer Paddy Hillyard goes one step further when he claims that
"Protestants can be said to have a vested interest in the continuing
emergency."35 .Attaining peace could, at least temporarily, damage an already
failing economy_
In conclusion, Catholics, for a plethora of reasons, bear the brunt of
,

ills caused by the Troubles_

Because of systematic discrimination and

powerful Protestant stereotypes, many Catholics are denied important civil
liberties, a decent education, and a chance to earn an honest living. And the
current stalemate does not bode well for the children of these people. But this

320'Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson, 185.
33RoW1horn and Wayne, 112.

...

34S a lly Belfrage, The Crack; A Belfast Year (Toronto: Grafton Books, 1987), 363.
35Paddy Hillyard, ·Political and Social Dimensions of Emergency Law in Northern
Ireland; in Justice Under Fire . The Abuse of Ciyil Liberties in Northern Ireland, ed. Anthony
Jennings, 2d ad. (London: Pluto Press, 1990). 194.
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institutionalized oppression transcends religion.

Poor Protestants and/or

anyone with even the most remote connections to paramilitaries must also
endure the follies of Unionist politicians and the apathy of Westminster. No
matter whose political responsibility Northern Ireland is supposed to be, it is
the Churchs' responsibility to help these people.

CHAPTER THREE
CATHOLIC VERSUS PROTESTANT
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Britain cannot be held fully

accountable for the current conflict in Northern Ireland. Political leaders of
all faiths have used the opposition's religion to bolster their arguments
against this or that.

But this theory, that religion has been 'hijacked' by

politicians, fails to explain everything. 1 And the hypothesis that church
leaders have brainwashed their parishes is an insult to millions of free
thinking Irish/Ulster people. This chapter will demonstrate that, over the
past four centuries, Protestant/Catholic relations in Northern Ireland, formed
by the clergy, the laity, and even those with little interest in religion, have
always involved a substantial degree of bitterness and distrust.

Today in

Ulster, the situation is no different.
During the time of Henry Vill, the Church of Ireland was merely viewed as
yet another Irish grievance against England 2 But with the arrival of the first
Planters, this grievance soon turned to Irish Catholic resentment.

At first,

class was the most important antagonizing factor. In general, Irish Protestants
were rich landowners who hoped to increase their wealth.

As the

Ascendancy gradually took control of the island, however, class differences
gradually became entwined with religious bigotry. The English government
initially imposed a physical separation on the two factions: the dispossession
"

1Historian and sociologist John Hickey concurs. Mpolitics in the North is not politics
exploiting religion. Thai is far too simple an explanation: John Hickey. Religion and the
Nodhero Ireland Problem. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984), 67.
2Eric Gallagher and Stanley Worrall, Christians in Ulster 1968-1980 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1982), 5.
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of Catholic tenants was an integral part of Plantation.

But Catholics and

Protestants also did their part to widen the gap socially and economically.
Jesuit missionaries fighting for Rome's Counter-Reformation warned their
flock of the Protestant zeal for proselytism. Stories of Protestant oppression in
Europe, such as the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre (1572) in France, fueled
the planters' siege mentality. Protestant distrust of Catholic Ireland reached
new heights after the 1641 Rebellion. 3 1690, the defeat of Catholic James II by
Protestant William of Orange, is arguably the most important date in
Northern Ireland's history.

It "drew attention to the difference between

'planted' Ulster and the rest of Ireland and thus sowed the seeds of eventual
partition."4
The penal laws epitomized Protestant-Catholic relations during the
eighteenth century.

The Ascendancy used its overwhelming and

disproportionate power to try to legislate 'popery' out of existence. As is often
the case in religious history, the persecution of Catholics only strengthened
their faith. It also widened the gap between Protestants and Catholics. Just as
1641 has not been forgotten by Protestants, the collective memory of the penal
laws serves as a grim reminder of the England's oppressive dominance over
Catholic Ireland,
Events in the nineteenth century offered some hope of improved
relations,

The penal laws became all but nonexistent.

The Catholic

emancipation bill was passed. Protestants, led by the Society of Friends, fed
Catholics during the potato famine. s

Tensions, however, soon surfaced

31nflated accounts of the casualties of 1641 only exacerbated this distrust.
4Gallagher and Worrall, 7.
5 Unfortunately, some evangelical Anglican clergymen, particularly in the Wesl of
Ireland, brought distrust to the notion of soup kitchens with 'Souperism': offering nourishment
to people in return for their conversion [sic].- (Aanelagh. 115.)
M

39
again. In the second half of the century, the Catholic hierarchy, in Ireland and
Rome, flexed its muscles.

The Syllabus of Errors (1864) and the pope's

proclamation of papal infallibility (1870) raised age-old Protestant fears of
Rome's power and influence. The Synod of Thurles, which insisted that Irish
children of an inter-denominational marriage be raised as Catholics, made
those fears even more reaL6 The Fenian movement, although denounced by
the hierarchy, was perceived as a Catholic offensive. At the same time, the
evangelical revival that took root in Ulster in 1859 solidified Catholic distrust
of Protestant proselytism.

The Ascendancy's adamant refusal to even

consider Home Rule also increased sectarian tensions.? These hostilities
were only quelled, and only in the South, after the imposition of the
Goverrunent of Ireland Act (1920).
The conflict in Northern Ireland has preserved anachronistic and
isolationist religious institutions.

One must remember that the English

government never made a wholehearted attempt to convert Catholic Ireland;
it only tried to suppress the Church with the penal laws. Figuratively, if not

literally, the Reformation is still being waged in Northern Ireland. To an
outsider, such a level of sectarian tensions may be difficult to believe. But a
brief look at two manifestations of present-day Loyalism, a holiday and a
leader, forcefully illustrate illustrate this point.
Historians David Gallagher and Stanley Worrall claim that Ulster
Protestants "have been on their guard"B since the 1641 Rebellion.

This

comment may be an oversimplification, but it is far from an exaggeration.
6Sean Connolly, ReligiQn and Society in Nineteenth Century Ireland, (Dublin:
•
Dundalgan Press Ltd.. 1985), 27.
7To be fair, "Protestants saw not merely their ascendancy but the survival Qf their
way of life endangered ... [The Catholic} Church was seen in such countries as Italy and Spain
to tQlerate no opinions but its own.· Gallagher and Worrall, 15.
8lbid.• 6.
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The 'Twelfth', the commemoration of William of Orange's victory, is not just
a national holiday; it is a day-long homage to everything that is Protestant
Ulster. Of course, for Catholics there is nothing to celebrate and many things
at which they can sneer. Union Jacks, already more prevalent in Northern
Ireland than in most parts of England, become ubiquitous on the Twelfth and
underscore the community's extreme loyalty to the crown. Parade watchers
wear T-shirts that proclaim themselves 'PROUD TO BE PROD.'9 Some
banners in the parades, for example ones that read THE COMING OF THE
LORD DRAWETH NIGH, are overtly apocalyptic and religious. Others praise
such folk heros as Martin Luther, Cromwell and the Duke of York. 10 And
others, such as the one of bearing a picture of " a turbaned black man kneeling
to a young Queen Victoria with the motto; 'The Secret of England's

Greatness'" 11 , hint at some of the reactionary attitudes that are tacit!y accepted
in Protestant Ulster.

Vitriolic clergy often use the day and the captive

audiences to preach familiar anti-Catholic rhetoric.
The Orange Order helps organize many of the day's activities. The
Order seems to embody all of the aforementioned elements of the Twelfth: a
romanticized conception of England, an exaggerated patriotism that borders
on self-parody, and Protestant belligerence. Many Twelfth parades climax
with the Orange Order passing a resolution:
As Orangemen we take seriously our commitment to a
Christianity which is Christ centered, Bible based, and true to the
beliefs of the Primitive Church.

9Prod is Irish slang for Protestant.
derogatory .
10Belfrage. 352-4.
11 Ibid. • 354.

Obviously. the term is not necessarily
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As Protestants we are determined to continue to declare
that faith in and by our Churches as Christians together in unity
of truth and brotherhood.
We are resolved to stand firm for the Protestant faith
against those who would destroy it by accommodation to error
or false doctrine, by manipulation or mis-use. 12

This resolution, taken from a 1980 celebration, is typical. Surprisingly, the
Orange Order has no formal ties to any church 13 , but it demonstrates just
how entangled religious intolerance and politics have become.
When combined with a charismatic leader, this fiercely anti-Catholic
and decidedly conservative Protestantism manifests itself in people like the
Reverend Ian R. K. Paisley.

One of the most visible figures in Northern

Ireland, Paisley has successfully combined vocations in religion and politics.
His Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), although just over twenty years old,
has consistently challenged the only other Unionist party, the Official
Unionist Party (OUP). In the 1983 Westminster general elections, the OUP
garnered 20% of the total Northern Ireland vote and three parliamentary
seats. The Reverend Paisley personally holds seats in the House of Commons
and the European Parliament. He has also fonned a maverick denomination,
the Free Presbyterian Church, which is one of the fastest growing religious
groups in Northern Ireland.
Paisley traces his roots to early Scottish planters. Although his father
was a Baptist pastor, Paisley himself was trained as a Presbyterian. This is
hardly accidental, for the Scottish Reformed Presbyterian Church of his
ancestors resembles Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church. Paisley biographers
Andy Pollak and Ed Moloney note that the Scottish Presbyterians were a
12Gallagher and Worrall, 21.
13Despite its disdain for ecumenical overtures involving the Catholic Church,
Gallagher and Worrall note that "no organization has done more to encourage
interdenominational services and mutual exchanges of pulpits be1wean Protestant
denominations· (italics mine). Ibid.• 194-5.

42
"God-fearing puritan people who held to an old-fashioned gospel as taught by
Calvin and John Knox."14

Paisley has kept this spirit alive with Free

Presbyterianism; he preaches simply, from the Bible. Like Calvin, he believes
that humanity is truly evil.' 5

And the Scottish Presbyterian distrust of

outsiders can easily be seen in almost any speech of Paisley's. From the pulpi t,
Paisley spews out a sectarian theology that is never mild and often crosses
over to hate-mongering. From the political platform, Paisley advocates the
end of direct rule and a return to the Stormont government which governed
Northern Ireland since its inception. 16 More often, he speaks out against

anything that might threaten Northern Ireland's link with Britain or give
privileges to Catholics.

Ecumenism, the Republic of Ireland, and, in

particular, the Roman Catholic Church are his favorite targets.

Using

familiar prophetic imagery, e.g., Rome is the Whore of Babylon and the Pope
is the Anti-ehrist, Paisley spins a web of anti-Catholicism that easily translates

into Unionist politics and Loyalist activism. In a recent survey, 74.5 percent
of Northern Ireland's Protestant population listed their reason for choosing
Unionism as 'fear of the power of the Roman Catholic Church.'17
For Paisley, actions speak louder than words. His theology, which is
so single-minded that it tends to become redundant, is often overshadowed
by his charisma. 18

His calm and dignified behavior in the European

Parliament, where he is on stage in front of an entire continent, is a testament

14MoJoney and Pollak. 21.
1558e Bruce. 9.
16The Reverend, however, has few thin9~ to say about the gerrymandering and
disproportional representation which made Stormount a de facto one-party government.
17 Bruce, 123.
18Bruce (199-219) argues, fairly convincingly, that, although Paisley is exceedingly
charismatic, his isolationist rhetoric and his reverence for Protestant Ulster's tradition
accounts for most of his popUlarity.
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not only to his charm but also his highly refined political skills. 19 He has a
definite flair for publicity stunts.

Whether tossing snowballs at the Irish

Prime Minister or being denied access to the Vatican, the Reverend Paisley
manages to rally support for his cause and play up his populist appeal.
Although Paisley and his followers are at one end of Northern
Ireland's religious spectrum, they represent a sizable minority within the
Protestant community.

Admittedly, they are not the only intransigent

elements in the conflict. While anti-Protestant attitudes are usually silenced
in Northern Ireland, vocal dissent can be found south of the border. The
Church's influence in Irish politics has remained strong in the twentieth
century.

In 1937, an amendment giving the Catholic Church special

recognition was added to the constitution of the Republic of Ireland.
Although it was removed without fanfare in 1972, the legacy of anti-Catholic
fear lives on. Quite simply, many Ulster Protestants view the Republic as a
Roman-occupied dinosaur. And they can point to evidence to confirm their
view: contraception is often difficult to obtain, divorce and even abortion
inforTMtion is illegal in the Republic.

As reporter Sally Belfrage confesses

"you don't need to be prejudiced, or even Protestant, to feel wary of the
'ecclesiastical imperialism' of the Catholic Church in Ireland."20 Historian
and sociologist John Hickey comments that the Roman Catholic clergy "in
fact control parishes and a school system, and exercise a control over their lay
members which represents a frightening monolith to an outside observer. JJ21
Protestants' fears that their rights will be silenced in an all-Ireland Republic
seem very real.
19Moloney and Pollak dedicate a whole chapter
the European Parliament and his opinions on the EEC.
20Belfrage, 391.

21 Hickey. 69.

(402-4 16)

to Paisl ey' s be havior in
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The cause of the deplorable relations between Catholic and
Protestants is much deeper than medieval superstition or vitriolic rhetoric.
Differences in the doctrines of Catholics and Protestants also fan the flams of
hatred and fear. Hickey soundly rejects the idea that doctrinal differences do
not heighten interdenominational tensions

and~

subsequently} extend the

conflict in Northern Ireland. Catholicism relies heavily on sacraments and
prayer as a way of achieving grace. The priest} who must administer the
sacraments} naturally becomes a respected member of the community and
part of a large hierarchy. The major non-conformist denominations in Ulster
(Presbyterian)

Methodist~

Baptist) profess a more direct form of grace. There is

a strong emphasis on scripture} while ritualism and the role of the clergy is
played down. 22 The CatholiC hierarchy} and the power it wields, are seen as
Jl

a denial of the right of the individual to approach God JJ23 direct! y; in the

mind of the Loyalist} such an intrusion eats away at one's liberties and
freedoms.

Although they are not usually explicitly expressed} doctrinal

differences exacerbate conflict in Northern Ireland.
Why should the Churches be involved in this political conflict ?
There is a simple answer to this question.

The Catholic Church and the

major Protestant denominations} while not fully responsible for the situation
in Northern Ireland} certainly have exacerbated the conflict at some point in
time. Thus, the Churches should accept partial blame for, and attempt to end,
this war between Christians.

"
22lbid. , 69-70.
23lbid.. 70.

CHAPTER FOUR
A LffiERAnON THEOLOGY IN NORTHERN IRELAND ?

Given the intransigence of the IRA, the intolerance of Unionists like
Paisley and the disinterest of the Westminster government. there seems to be
no one who wants to seek out some sort of middle ground in Northern
Ireland's dispute. It seems as if the churches are the only institutions with
the potential power and commitment to seek change in Northern Ireland.
But, as we have seen, any ecumenical overtures have been drowned out by
the presiding religious intolerance since the days of Plantation.

Must all

theologies be competing and antagonistic ones that only fuel the fires of
political stubbornness and sectarian violence? Over the past twenty years, a
phenomenon called liberation theology has become an emerging and
provocative force within Christianity, particularly in the so-called Third
World.

Although it is squarely rooted in scripture and traditional rituat

liberation theology turns the likes of Augustine and Aquinas upside-down.
Just the titles, e.g., Communism in the Bible 1 and Planetary Theology2,
suggest their unique and controversial approach. Can such a theology thrive
in Northern Ireland?
First, we must answer the question 'what exactly is liberation
theology l' The term itself is so broad that any definition would exclude
someone and satisfy no one. 3 Liberation theologians come from all over the

1Jose Miranda. Communism jn the Bjble. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1982).
2Tissa Balasuriya, PlanetarY Theoloav, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. 1984).

3~A definitlon acceptable to everyone would be as dif1icult to formulate as would a
precise characterization of theology itself: Deane William Ferm, Third World Liberation
Theologies . An IntroductorY Survey (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), 1.
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globe and write on a myriad of religious topics. Most scholars have wisely
refrained from establishing any kind of confining definition of liberation
theology.

Theology professor Roger Haight stresses one of the most

important facts concerning liberation theology; it is in no way a unified or
univocal school of thought. Haight is also quick to point out that liberation
theology is a very young and still developing movement. 4 In any discussion
of the subject, it is imperative to remember that no explicit system of thought
governs liberation theology.S
Deane William Ferm, a well-published interpreter of modern
theology, dares to go a little further.

Ferm includes among liberation

theologies any truly indigenous theology which "stresses liberation from all
forms of human oppression: social, economic, political, racial, sexual,
environmental, religious." B In this broad scope, any theology with a specific
group in mind, e.g., black theology, feminist theology, falls under the category
of liberation theology.

This paper, however, will primarily deal with

theology of economic oppression. 7
For Indonesian theologian Albert Widjaja, this idea of liberation is
intrinsically linked with rejecting traditional theology and starting over. 8 He
claims that "to be true and faithful to Jesus Christ one has to be detached from

4Roger Haight. S. J., An Alternative Vision . An lntemretatjon of Liberation
Theologv. (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press. 1985), 15.
5perhaps ten years from now the term 'liberation theology' will be considered
colonialistic and, for all intents and purposes, obsolete. But for now, we must use the term.
SFerm, Syrvey, 1.
7Undoubtedly, some theologians (Tissa Balasuriya in particular) would object to this
classification. But, in the reader's interest, such generalizations must be made.
8Widjaja throws out the names of several traditional theologians, including Luther,
Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, to make his point.
Albert Widjaja, "Beggarly
Theology: A Search for a perspective toward Indigenous Theology," in Third World Liberation
Theologies' A Beader. ed. Deane William Ferm, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), 368.
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the demand of conformity to human-made theology."9

Indeed, many

liberation texts are a radical departure from traditional Christian theology. In
fact, all of the above assertions are valid generalizations about liberation
theology. There seems to be only one defining trait that can be applied to all
of liberation theology: criticism and controversy always follows it.

By

examining some of the criticisms engendered by the emergence of liberation
theologies, this chapter will derive a working outline of liberation theology.
Liberation theology is most often criticized for its radical economic
positions. Mexican theologian Elsa Tamez states that the "accumulation of
wealth is incompatible with Christianity." 10 Gustavo Gutierrez, a Catholic
priest from Peru who started writing theology in the late 1960's, is one of the
first and most famous liberation theologians. He has gone as far as to claim
that a "preference for the poor is written into the gospel message itself."11
Arthur McGovern, in his fairly even-handed analysis of liberation theology,
defends Gutierrez, claiming that he has been misunderstood.

McGovern

explains that Gutierrez "seeks ... a restoration of true unity in society, not the
victory of one class over another."12 Regardless of his intent, this statement
and similar ones have provided a reason for critics to summarily dismiss
liberation theology.13 That Guttierez's seemingly innocent use of the word

9lbid. , 369.
10EIsa Tamez, "Good News far the Paor,~ in Third World Liberation Theologies: A
Reader, eel. Deane William Ferm, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), 193.

11 Gustava Gutierrez, ~Liberation and the Poor: The Puebla Perspective,· in I.b..ird.
World Liberation Theoloojes ; A Reader. ed. Deane William Ferm, (Maryknoll. NY: Orbis Books,
1986), 25.
12Arthur McGovern, Liberation Theology' and Its Critics.(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 1989), 188.
131ncidentally, McGovern summarizes the most common criticisms of liberation
theology. Uberation theologians (1) reduce faith to politics, (2) use Marxist and socialist ideas
uncritically and (3) create a separate church. McGovern, 58-60.
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'preference' has provoked such a strong reaction demonstrates the narrow
path many liberation theologians must walk.
Of course, almost all liberation theologians come from the most

impoverished areas in the world where the poorer classes have virtually no
rights. In their theology, calls for an economic re-structuring often go hand in
hand with cries for improved human rights.
"Christians are a casteless community.'"

4

Samuel Rayan believes that
Fellow Indian theologian

Geevarghese Mar Osthathios uses some of the most fiery rhetoric. He boldly
asserts that "God permits class war to create a classless society." 15 These and
similar theories leave the theologians open to one of the most common
criticism of their school: liberation theology is merely Marxist dogma dressed
in a white collar. Although many theologians do not try to hide their Marxist
influences, these blanket accusations are largely unjustified.

Balasuriya

speaks for many of his peers when he writes '1 have not accepted Marxism as
an adequate interpretation of reality, nor have I totally rejected it as bad."16
Clodovis Boft a pioneer in the methodology of liberation theology, sees
Marxism as "an instrument of social analysis."17 not a full blown ideology
underpinning his entire theology.

Still, Boff confesses that "he and other

liberation theologians have not always been vocal enough in pointing out the
defects of Marxism, especially its materialistic and atheistic components,"18

14Samuel Rayan, "The Justice of God: in Third World Liberation Theologies ; A
Reader, ed. Deane William Ferm. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), 353.
15Geervarghese Mar Osthathlos. -The Reality of Sin and Class War: in Third World
Liberation Theologies; A Beader. ad. Deane William Farm, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986),
342.
16TI5sa Balasuriya In Deane William Perm, profiles in Liberation (Mystic, CT;
Twenty-Third Publications, 19BB), B4.
17 Deane William Farm, Profiles jn Liberation (Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third
Publications, 1988). 122.
18lbid.
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Yet another criticism often directed at liberation theology is that it
advocates violent revolution.

Again this assertion is an exaggeration.
l

Albeit certain figures have tainted liberation theology with overtones of
l

violence.

Ernesto Cardenal l a Nicaraguan poet and liberation theologian,

"reluctantly [came] to see the need to meet violence with violence.'"

9

Ferm

maintains that Jose Minguez Bonino "does declare that the violence of the
oppressors sometimes demands violence in return."20 But these two are
truly exceptions. Most liberation theologians, Segundo Galilea and Leonardo
BoH to name only a pair, have explicitly denounced violence.
Still others have put forward opinions that critics have interpreted as
ambiguous.

Gutierrez who is far from an unambiguous ad vocate of
l

violence, is bold enough to admit that violent revolution in some parts of
South America is inevitable. Juan Luis Segundo claims that opting for non
violence is not an integral aspect of faith. 21

But McGovern, a foremost

interpreter of liberation theology in English, claims that he has "yet to find
any statement by a liberation theologian calling for violent revolution or
declaring it necessary for bringing about sodal change."22 Aquinas's 'just
war theory, a highly subjective litmus test, has long been used to justify
violent conflict.

Despite this precedent of ambivalent positions on

violence 23 Segundo Gutierrez and others are criticized and scrutinized for
1

l

having supposedly unorthodox views on violence.

'9Ibid. , 138.
20Ferm. Survey. 16..

"

21 McGovern, 187.
22lbid. , 186.
230f course, in the past Chris1ianity has demonstrated
unambiguously. advocated violence, e.g., the Crusades and the Inquisition.

stands

that,

very

50
For many liberation theologians a more effective way of responding
to this criticism is the theory of 'institutionalized violence.'24

The countries

in which these theologians live and write are societies "riddled with
violence/ 25 but institutionalized violence, the systematic impoverishment
and disempowerment of the common people, is the most pervasive form of
violence.

Perpetuated by those in power on a daily basis, it further

dehwnanizes the poor and eats away at the fabric of their society. As Ferm
puts it when addressing the subject of institutionalized violence; "[To] accuse
some liberation theologians of fomenting physical violence ..., without ...
condemning those in power who continue to use violence, is hypocrisy of the
worst kind. "26
Critics maintain that liberation theology treats the Bible as secondary
to history and politics.

Or as Ferro phrases it, liberation theologians

'politicize' their faith. 27 Critics perceive liberation theologians as taking a
specific world view first and then cloaking it in religious rhetoric.

But as

Ferm points out, almost every theologian exists in a certain historical context
and places personal preferences on his or her reading of the Bible "which will
always be limited and to some extent self-serving."28

Hugo Assmann, a

liberation theologian from Brazil, believes that "theology is never devoid of a
specific historical and temporal setting."29

Indeed, contexualized

interpretations of the Bible are nothing new to any brand of theology.

24This concept was originally developed at a conference of South American bishops
(CHAM II, 1968).
25Ferm. Profiles. 116.
26lbid.

27 See Farm, Survey. 104-107.
28lbid. , 101.
29Ferm. p rofj les. 116.
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Uberation theologians, however, are singled out for having this ubiquitous
flaw.
At the heart of most liberation theology lies a new and different
approach to reading scripture. But this new approach is not necessarily over
critical.

Instead, the typical liberation theologian attempts to re-examine

more traditional views: interpretations of scripture which gave rise to
inquisitions and witch-burnings. Not surprisingly, themes of liberation and
justice comprise the core of this new exegesis. Biblical stories of redemption
from oppression, e.g., the Israelites in Egypt or the Passion narrative, are
given preference. Often, liberation theologians are inspired by the prophets
who boldly denounced Israel for her injustices. Elsa Tamez's Bible of the
Oppressed is a "careful study of the theme of oppression/liberation"30 within
scripture. Balasuriya claims that "the New Testament clearly demands social
justice. "31

Some scriptural interpretations, particularly those concerning

Christ, seem quite radical. Leonardo Boft asserts that "Christ did not come to
bring a new morality, different from the one people already had."32 Jose
Miranda, who feels that communism and social equality are intrinsically
related, claims that "Jesus himself was a communist." 33 These two theses,
however, are exhaustively documented with biblical quotes.

In fact, most

liberation theologians carefully use the Bible to bolster their arguments. 34
30Ferm, Survey. 191.
31 nssa Balasuriya, planetary Theology, 257.
32leonardo Boff, -Jesus, a Person of Extraordinary Good Sense, Creative
Imagination, and Originality: in Third World I jberatjon Theologies . A Beader, ed. Deane
William Ferm, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. 1986), 111.
33Jose Miranda, MChristianity Is Communism," in Third World Liberation Theologies
; A Reader. ed. Deane William Ferm, (Maryknoll, Ny:.. . Orbis Books, t 986), 165.
34Miranda, while defending the above assertion, claims that he and his "Latin
American brothers and sisters . . . are shameless conservatives. [TheYI are looking for the
M
literal gosp8I. ("Christianity is Communism," 162) This position is a brilliant ploy, but it is
not without its faults. He has placed himself in the same camp with biblical literalists; Miranda
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Segundo Galilea goes so far as to lash out against those who lido not find their
inspiration and orientation in the gospel."35 As Ferm comments, "liberation
theologians ... take their Christian convictions very seriously; they do not
treat them as a secondary consideration or as an ex post facto ra tionalization
of a given political stance."36
Uberation theology is also criticized because "it loses sight of the
ontological and transcendent dimensions of theology. "37

Praxis, the

synthesis of prayerful reflection and action, is certainly an integral part of
liberation theology. Many theologians are adamant in emphasizing the doing
of theology. Gutierrez insists that living JJwitnesses rather than theological
speculation will point out the direction of a spirituality of Jiberation."38 Jose
Minguez Bonino contends that "theology has to stop explaining the world
and to start transforming it."39 The brothers Boff, Leonardo and Clodovis,
maintain that "commitment to liberation and participation in the liberation
process must precede theology proper."40 To their credit, the world cannot be
changed merely with words.

Ferm admits, however, that "liberation

theologians sometimes overlook or dismiss the intellectual nourishment
that led them to their present convictions."41

can justifiably be labeled a demagogue. If liberation theologians, in the spirit of Widjaja, wish
to truly distance themselves from the didactic theology of the past, then the removal of any
'fundamentalist' trappings should be at the forefront of their agenda.
35Segun do Galilea, -Jesus and the Liberation of his People," in Third World
Liberation Theologies; A Beader, ed. Deane William Ferm, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986),

177.
36Ferm, Su rvey, 102.

37lbid.
38Gustavo Gutierrez, "A Spirituality of Liberation,in Third World Liberation
Theologjes ; A Reader. ed. Deana William Farm, (Mctryknoll. NY: Orbis Books. 1986). 368-372.
39Jose Minguez Bonino, Doing Theologv in a Revolutionary Situation, (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1975). 81.
40McGovern,

36.

41 Ferm, Survey, 103.
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From these accusations and corresponding rebuttals, one can form
the bare bones of an outline of the characteristics of liberation theology. First
and foremost, liberation theology is (1) an economically-attuned theology
which (2) strives for the poor and marginalized. It also (3) must come to
terms with any competing or corresponding political and/or violent
revolution; and (4) it proposes a non-traditional approach to scripture and
reflection/action that is often called praxis. 42

UBERATION THEOLOCY AND THE CONTEXT OF NORTHERN IRELAND

Given the model of liberation theology discussed above, can one exist
in Northern Ireland's unique situation? What adjustments would have to
be made? Cahal Daly, the Primate of All Ireland, about whom much more
will be said, wants to change the minds of the people of Northern Ireland. He
sees the cessation of religious bigotry and sectarian violence as the area's top
priority. With this aim and informed by the above outline, a framework for a
Northern Ireland liberation theology can be built.
Many liberation theologians advocate the dismantling of capitalistic
systems and, as we have seen earlier, use Marxism as a tool of social analysis.
In Northern Ireland's politically conservative climate, any anti-capitalist
overtones could spell the death of a liberation theology.

Socialism is

unpopular with much of the Protestant community.43 The Vatican, with
which Irish Catholics have particularly strong ties, has repeatedly denounced

42For the sake of comparison, Haight outli~es what he sees as 'he six methodological
themes of liberation theology: (1) a response to the non·person in history (2) the theory of
dependence (3) the symbol of liberation (4) praxis (5) a prior option for the poor and (6) a
method for doing theology. Haight, 44-47.
43Bruce, 259.
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Marxism and communism as atheistic and materialistic. Moreover, the IRA
and Sinn Fein, anathema to much of Northern Ireland, desire a socialist
republic. Marxism is far too politically charged for Northern Ireland; if it
were used in a liberation theology, even as a methodological tool, its
detriments would undoubtedly outweigh its benefits.
However, if the primary goal of lessening religious bigotry and
violence were to be achieved, improved economic condi tions would
theoretically follow. Most importantly, foreign companies would no longer
shy away from investing in Northern Ireland. These jobs would more than
compensate for the unemployment caused by the reduction in the security
forces.

Catholic minds that were previously denied access to prestigious

occupations would invigorate the workforce.

Such a decrease in

unemployment would cut welfare payments and further destroy Protestant
stereotypes of Catholics as lazy, further enhancing interdenominational
relations.

There appears to be no need for a Northern Treland liberation

theology to make major economic restructuring a high priority.
Still, a liberation theology must be keenly aware of the down-trodden
classes. There can be no denying that Catholics are a marginalized class of
people in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association's
clashes with the RUC exacerbated the Troubles.

But their goals, which

included an end to job discrimination and gerrymandering and the Special
Powers Act, decent housing and fair elections, still have not been reached.
Catholics are systematically discriminated against and they receive the worst
state housing, in segregated areas. Moreover, gerrymandering ensures that
their political voice remains disproportionate. The Protestant labourer's
opinion, that "so many Catholic businesses ... haven't a Protestant in them.
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And nobody wants to look into ... how bigoted [Catholics] are,"44 becomes
logically faulty when one considers the religious denomination of the
majority of those in power, both in government and business.
Before proceeding, it is important to underscore the point that a
Northern Ireland liberation theology could not be based on a preference for
the Catholic poor. A liberation theology should acknowledge the unfortunate
situation of Roman Catholics in Ireland. But, if it were to grant them distinct
privileges, for example a call for hiring quotas or money earmarked explicitly
for Catholics, then it would immediately alienate the Protestant community.
For economic oppression is not the only form of oppression in Northern
Ireland.

In writing a liberation theology for Northern Ireland, one must

consider that Protestants are 'potentially oppressed.' Civilians are possible
victims of stray gunfire and indiscriminate bombings. Suspected members of
Loyalist paramilitary groups are routinely hassled by the security forces. And
those Protestants in the security forces, particularly the UDR (the Ulster
Defense Regiment, a 98 percent Protestant division of the RUe) are in
constant danger, no matter what their rank. The legitimate fears of Ulster
Protestants have to be recognized in order to insure fairness. In order to
change minds in Northern Ireland, a liberation theology must attempt to
embrace all elements involved.
Embracing all of the elements involved does not necessarily mean
condoning all of the actions of those involved.

Republican and Loyalist

paramilitary groups, the RUC and the British Army all view violence as a
legitimate means to their end.

Still others, including the Westminster

government, give tacit approval to thuggery.

44Belfrag9, 363.

The UDA, which has
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undoubtedly been responsible for hundreds of sectarian killings, is still a legal
organization. 45

The results of policies that tolerated or even advocated

violence, in particular, a twenty-three year long stalemate a war-torn country
and, by European standards, a pathetic economy, demonstrate their inherent
futility. The IRA and the INLA have proven to be regenerating creatures that
are entrenched in every nook and cranny on both sides of the border. The
RUC and the British Army, which provide steady, lucrative employment,
also have a large pool of recruits. All sides have contributed some form of
violence which has exacerbated the conflict.
Any theology in Northern Ireland that condones, or even tolerates,

sectarian violence is destined to fail.

This is merely due to the fact that

violence, in the form of revolution and counter-revolution, exists on both

sides of the conflict. The first step in ending sectarian violence is a total and
unequivocal condemnation of it.
We have also seen that liberation theology tends to look at scripture
in a new, sometimes quite controversial, light. But a theology for Northern
Ireland should avoid adding additonal and unnecessary contoversy. Theories
like those of Miranda (which claims that Christ was a Communist), although
well documented, easily can (and would) be taken out of context and
distorted. The Protestant emphasis on 'scripture alone' Ii ves on as a defining
trait of the faith, especially with Northern Ireland's populist denominations.
More importantly, a non-traditional exegesis would do little to bring together
two religiously conservative factions. Instead of re-interpreting the gospels, a

45 For a detailed discussion of this situation, see Peter Hall, "The Prevention of
Terrorism'- in Justice Under Eire' The Abuse of Civil Liberties in Northern Iceland. ed.
Anth any Jennings, 2d ed. (Lond on: PI uta Press, 1990), 149- 151.
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Northern Ireland-based liberation theology should focus on developing a
working Christology.
Christ is, after all, who and what unites Catholics and Protestants.
The figure of Christ has been the linchpin of liberation theology in Latin
America.

Hijacking an already existing Latin American liberation

Christology, however, would do little good.

Instead, a Christology more

attuned to the problems of Northern Ireland should be developed. Taking a
cue from Leonardo Boff. one could start by emphasizing and simplicity of
Christ's message; "Jesus does not wish to say something new ... [or] ...
astonishing things, but things people can comprehend on their own if they
have clear vision and a little good sense."46 Add to this pragmatism Christ's
message of unconditional love. By peeling away the layers of hate-inspiring
history and simply emphasizing love as the focal point of Christianity, a
liberation theology for Northern Ireland could slowly move away from the
out-dated isolationism of Rome or the angry rhetoric of Paisley.
Finally, a liberation theology for Northern Ireland must make a call
to action. During Ulster's history, ecumenical services, rallies and umbrella
group peace marches have slowly gained momentum only to fizzle out. But,
a cohesive theology and organization would hopefully bind these kinds of
movements and initiatives together and give them strength in numbers. As
discussed earlier, a Northern Ireland liberation theology would also rely on
prayerful and theological reflection, which would, in turn, fuel more action.
Thus, the above four elements--the recognition of Catholics and,
indeed poor Protestants, as marginalized, the denunciation of any and all
violence, a carefully-worded emphasis on Jesus, and an ecumenical call to

4680ff. 112.
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action--would form the core of the liberation theology's doctrine.

These

would all help a liberation theology for Northern Ireland attain its primary
goal: a cessation, or at least a substantial decrease, in bigotry and violence.

CHAPTER FIVE

CAHAL DALY'S UBERATION THEOLOGY

Cahal Daly is now the the Primate of All Ireland. That is, he is the
the head of the Roman Catholic Church in both the Republic and Northern
Ireland. He answers directly to Rome for a country which is

90~95

percent

Catholic. Given the fact that most liberation theologians are reprimanded by
their respective hierarchies, he is hardly in a position to be making waves.
Perhaps this is why, in his book The Price of Peace', Daly uses the term
'liberation theology' only once. This section will attempt to prove, however,
that The Price of Peace effectively outlines a liberation theology for war-torn
Northern Ireland.
Daly was three years old when his homeland was partitioned. He
graduated from Queen's University in Belfast and became an ordained priest
in 1941. He was a theological adviser at Vatican II. In 1967, he was ordained
as a bishop.

He has been actively involved in ecumenical and peace

movements for years. In 1973/ Daly was a key speaker at the ground-breaking
Ballymascanlon conferences which brought together figures from all of the
major churches.
The Price of Peace is a unique endeavor in ecumenism. Although it
is the goal of the book, Daly goes well beyond a simple call for peace. He
delves into the reasons behind the Troubles and questions the motives of
those involved.

He also develops several unique and refreshing

1Cahal Daly, The Price of peace, (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press. 1991).

59

60

ways of vieiwng the conflict. All the while, Daly's text seems fall within the
previous guidelines of a liberation theology.

A THEOLOGY OF ASCENT

Cahal Daly does not dwell in an ivory tower. The cover of The Price
of Peace shows the bishop being warmly greeted by a crowd of Irish people.
All that we know about Daly reinforces the message behind the cover
photograph.

Capturing this apparent down-to-earth disposition was no

publicity stunt.

Answering a journalist's question ('What is the Church

doing to solve the problems of Northern Ireland ?'), Daly once took offense at
the idea that hierarchical action equals the action of the Church.

Daly

explained:
It can thus be used as an alibi by laymen to escape Christian

responsibility. It diverts the attention of laymen from the fact that
they are the Church. It ignores the fact that temporal, social and
even political action is Christian action (italics mine).2
This quote is important for several reasons.

Most importantly, Daly

acknowledges the tremendous importance of the laity. He also calls the laity
to action in all realms of society.

Although Daly does not go as far as

Leonardo Boff, for example, who believes that the Roman Catholic Church's
hierarchical view "is approaching its inevitable end,"3 he is chipping away at
the traditional model of the hierarchy. The bishop is also asking his flock to
take a specific political position. Daly affirms that "to identify the Christian
faith with any political party is a prostitution of the Gospel."4 Undoubtedly,

2Gallagher and Worrall, 209.
3Leonardo 80ft. in Ferm, Profiles, 126.
4Daly. 37.
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this quote is a thinly veiled attack on Paisley and his ilk, but Daly is at least
trying to change perceptions of the Church.
Daly's belief in a grassroots doctrine geared toward common people, a
theology of ascent, manifests itself in The Price of Peace. He writes to all those
who live in Northern Ireland, but time after time, he speaks for the poor.
Daly firmly believes that the Troubles have been the main cause of Northern
Ireland's economic woes. In particular, he is convinced that an increase in
employment rates would do considerably more than decrease poverty; it
would greatly reduce the moral malaise which has inflicted Northern Ireland.
"Unemployment," writes Daly", is one of the great social evils and
injustices of our time. us It makes for a great deal of strain on families and
marriages. 6 The idleness and lack of independence caused by unemployment
"feeds the spirit of resentment and rebellion"7 among Northern Ireland's
youth.

The sky-high rates of unemployment caused by the Troubles

exacerbate domestic problems and juvenile crime. It is important to note,
however, that Daly is not chiding the unemployed to go and find work. He is
well aware of the bleak job prospects in Belfast. Speaking largely on behalf of
the poor Northern Irish in his own flock, Bishop Daly attempts to remove the
stigma of receiving welfare payments, or 'being on the dole.'
Every industrial enterprise now benefits from massive public
subsidy, both in terms of direct grant and in tenns of tax relief and
tax incentive. Every industrial worker is a beneficiary of state
subsidy ... It is paradoxical that industrial grants regarded as

5lbid. , 114~

"'

6lbkl. , 117.

7lbid. Here we can assume Daly is using the word 'rebellion' in a negative context,
that is, nihilistic and destructive rebellion, paramilitary involvement, or rebellion for
rebellion's sake.
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rewards for enterprise, while unemployment benefits are regarded
as dole money for the work-shy or for 'welfare spongers. '8
Daly also touches upon the 'vicious cycle' created by Britain. By writing a
huge welfare check for Northern Ireland every year, the Westminster
government effectively thwarts any attempts to affect real change in Ulster.
In Daly's words, the dole and job-training programs "are no substitute for

government initiatives to create real jobs."g
However, the marginalized in Northern Ireland are affected by more
than economic factors. Class segregation is compounded "by the increasing
physical segregation between the Protestant and Catholic communities."1o
Families voluntarily move to the appropriate denominational ghettos.
Others are intimidated out of non-segregated areas. Daly notes, however, that
sectarian segregation is implemented as a part of government policy.11
Physical separation inevitably leads to a furthered polarization of the two
_communities. In turn this polarization leads to government favoritism of
certain areas and 'communal guilt.'
disposition

By 'communal guilt,' Daly means "a

to blame the whole community for

the sins of an

unrepresentative few."12 It leads to the British Army "'leaning heavily' on
people from certain addresses, from certain social, cultural or political
backgrounds, [or] carrying certain family names." 13

More importantly,

communal guilt reinforces centuries-old sectarian stereotypes; it further
polarizes the Protestant and Catholic communities.

8lbid.. 116.
9lbid.• 115.
1 aIbid. , 119.
11lbid.
12lbid. , 77.
13lbld. , 141.
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This denunciation of communal guilt leads Daly to condemn British
injustices against Irish people in England. In particular, he strongly criticizes
the trial and treatment of Birmingham Six, half a dozen men who were
incarcerated for a pair of IRA bombings in Birmingham in 1974.

The

evidence and the apparently coerced confessions of the Six have always been
very suspect. Many believe that British outrage at the 16 people who were
killed, in conjunction with the men's ties to the IRA, sent the Six to prison.
They were finally released in March of 1991.

The trial, in Daly's mind,

"demonstrates weaknesses in the British legal system that must be
remedied." 14
But Daly is not only pointing a finger at the government and the
army. He squarely places a large amount of blame on the IRA and INLA for
helping to perpetuate communal guilt, for being that 'unrepresentative few.'
Daly has absolutely no sympathy for Republicans who advocate violence; in
his mind, they are partially responsible for the continuation of the Troubles.
Bishop Daly contends that Republican paramilitaries are as much to blame for
the breakdown of justice in Northern Ireland as Westminster and the British
Army. Although an injustice against all of Ireland, Daly places a "major
share of responsibility"15 for the imprisonment of the Birmingham Six on
the IRA. The IRA, he claims, could have turned in the actual bombers and
freed the innocent men years ago.
Daly continues to dismantle the Republicans' arguments. The IRA's
methods of quelling internal unrest, which are substantially more unjust
than any Diplock court, have been well documented. Kneecapping, Le, firing
a bullet into the back of each knee, is the most common penalty for a first
14lbid. , 165.
15lbid.
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offense. Daly maintains that "the barbaric behaviour of such 'punishment
squads' is a measure of the ... debasement of the quality of life that IRA
violence has inflicted on some cornmunities."16

Daly boldly asks the

question 'how can the IRA promise freedom and civil rights to the island of
Ireland when its internal structure resembles a ruthless oligarchy?'
Daly also questions the paramilitaries' role in keeping law and order.
Because the RUe does not enter hard-core nationalist areas, paramilitaries are
left to police the community. To its credit, the IRA has no tolerance for
hooliganism outside the organization and has kept crime at unbelievably low
levels in Catholic ghettos. Of course, this has been achieved through threats
and 'punishment squads.' More importantly, the majority of the crime that
does exist in Catholic ghettos is undertaken by members of Republican

groups.

"Paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland," states European

reporter David McKittrick, "net very large amounts of money through
racketeering."17 Daly points to the dangers of Republican crime; he claims
that it sets a horrible precedent and lowers already abysmal moral
standards. 18 Daly concludes with a strong statement against Republican
paramilitaries : "crime, marital breakdown (and] family neglect are the
inseparable consequences of their campaign."19 Bishop Daly speaks for the
marginalized, primarily poor Catholics, but he also points to all the factors
that have contributed to their condition.

AN END TO VIOLENCE

1Sibid.• 57.
17Dav id McK Inrick. .wD~esllAP~awtc<.IJh~esliL......LF...J..:roltLmu.......JoBotliewlf.iilJas
....t". (Be Ifas t: Tha BI ac kslaff P rass,

1989), 146.
18Daly, 57.
1 9lbid. , 58.
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While debunking the paramilitaries of their status as upholders of
justice, Daly further blasts them for their violent ways. As suggested earlier, a
total and unqualified denunciation of violence is essential to a Northern
Ireland liberation theology. Daly has no qualms about such an approach.
"Violence must ... be declared morally and politically bankrupt;'20 writes
Daly. He adds that "the futility of physical force is now glaringly evident."21
But Bishop Daly goes beyond emotional rhetoric.

He makes an all-out

attempt to counter any argument for Republican violence.

In fact, Bishop

Daly goes as far as to apply Aquinas's 'just war theory' to the Republican
cause. First, the Republican claim that "war is being waged in the name and
on behalf of the people of Ireland is devoid of all plausibility."22 As seen
earlier,

Sinn Fein's popularity since the onset of the Troubles, has never

translated into more than a tenth of the vote in the Republic (which
comprises approximately 70 percent of the island's population). Thus, the
cause, Republicanism, fails Aquinas' test of 'competent authority.'

The

second and third criterion of a just war, Le., a just cause and a morally correct
intention, are left unanswered.

Although these cannot be proven with

statistics like the first criterion, Daly would surely reject this pair of claims.
Daly's attack on the guerilla warfare of the Republican paramilitaries
continues; the civilian lives taken by IRA and INLA guns "are a betrayal of
historical republicanism"23 which waged a military war.
Violence is perpetauted by all sides involved in the conflict. Daly
strongly admonishes Britain's one-dimensional treatment of the Troubles.
20lbid.•
21 Ibid.•
22lbid. ,
23lbid. ,
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The government cannot limit its policy to the "exclusive concentration on
military and police aspects of security."24 Because it directs Ulster's destiny,
Daly contends that Westminster must set a precedent of non-violence and
experiment with other solutions.

He is not naive enough to suggest the

withdrawal of the British Army, but the "greatest mistakes ... have been
those [policy decisions] which resulted from the belief that there were quick,
effective, 'relentless and resolute' military and police methods"25 of ending
violence.

Bishop Daly also reprimands the RUe for the numerous

questionable killings that have taken place during the Troubles.

"It is

deplorable," writes Daly, "that the police should have provided precisely the
material desired for the IRA propaganda machine."26 Loyalist paramilitary
organizations are also condemned.

Sectarian murders, which have been

carried out for centuries by paranoid loyalists, are, in Daly's words "a betrayal
of the Protestant faith."27

FINDING COMMON GROUND

The Ecumenical Imperative is the title of Daly's ninth, and perhaps
most important, chapter. The bishop believes that labeling the conflict in
Northern Ireland solely a religious dispute is nothing more than a excuse for
politicians to do nothing.

Moreover, he insists that "Churchmen have

appealed to to the political model as a means of opting out of their religious
responsibilities." 28 In Daly's mind, the conflict can be seen as religious only

24lbid.• 141.
25lbid.
26lbid.• 152.
27lbid. , 82.
281bid.. 190.
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when one considers those who have perverted Christianity's message as the
primary religious leaders. In other words, when people like Paisley or priests
who aid the IRA are no longer considered Christians, the conflict will cease to
be a religious one.
Daly first attacks Loyalist paramilitaries.

"They can claim to be

defending Protestantism or Bible Christianity," he asserts, but their
"Prot~stantism is

sociological, not religious. Their Christianity is a politico

cultural ideology."29 He similarly denounces Republicanism's secularization
of Roman Catholicism. In particular, Daly abhors the use of 'quasi-religious'
symbolism in the struggle for an Irish nation. Comparing the Passion with
the IRA hunger strikers of 1981, for example, was a disgusting
misrepresentation of Christianity.30

In another thinly-veiled attack at

Paisley, the bishop denounces those leaders who use Old Testament imagery
to equate Protestant Ulster with the persecuted, but Covenanted tribes of
Israel. Daly decries both sides equally for subjugating religion for their own
devices. Admitting that they may retain "fanaticism of a pseudo-religious
kind," Daly dismisses such people as "totally and defiantly outside all
influence from the living Church."31
Daly's denunciation of those who inject sectarianism into
Christianity leads into his next point.
implying the Christian
reconciled society.

1J

32

The Church (and he seems to be

Church), he says, is "the prototype of a just and

Therefore, any true member of the Church must try to

uphold this high standard. In Daly's words, ecumenism "is not an optional

29lbid.• 191.

30 Ibid.

• 192.
31 Ibid. . 192.
32lbid.• 199.
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extra for Christians. It is at the heart of our faith." 33 Given the circumstances
surrounding Northern Ireland, ecumenism is indeed an imperative.
Not surprisingly, Daly suggests that a spiritual renewal will lead
Northern Ireland Christians in an ecumenical direction. His logic is painfully
simple. "The closer becomes our relationship with Christ Our Saviour ... the
greater will be our respect for other believers in Jesus Christ who is their Lord
as well as ours." 34 Daly confesses that clergy on both sides of the dispute have
neglected to place ecumenical measures at the top of their lists of priorities.
In his mind, reflection on the Troubles has done little. He comments that
"(T]heological dialogue is by no means the whole of ecumenism./l35 This
frustration leads us to the fourth and most important element of Daly's
liberation theology.

A DRAMATIC CALL TO ACTION

Daly's prose, when he writes of what may happen after peace is
declared in Northern Ireland, is obviously theoretical. Bu t, more often than
not, the bishop writes with action on his mind. He has seen glimpses of the
effectiveness of ecumenism and wants to see more. /II believe," writes Daly,
"that practical steps can be taken to multiply opportunities for contact."36
From here, Daly outlines an abundance of ecumenical activities that can only
bring together Christians and increase understanding.
Daly is happy to report that ecumenical services are no longer
anathema in Ulster, but he contends that they must become commonplace
33lbid.
34lbid. , 199-200.
351bid. , 206.
36lbid. , 202.
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and not an exception. In particular, Daly sees holidays as a perfect time for
interdenominational celebrations.

Joint bible readings is another suggestion

of Dalys. He is not afraid to laud the power of scripture. "All of us derive
our faith from the Bible/' 37 writes Daly. Clergy fraternals 38 would not only
bring together ministers and priests of differnt faiths, but they would also
supply are larger 'brain pool' to tackle the problems that clergy face.
Keeping in line with his populist slant, Daly believes that ecumenical
services and gatherings must be extended to the level of the laity.

In

recommending the institution of a ecumenical council, he states that "such a
group should be informal and local, rather than nationwide." 39 He also
advocates the institution of 'regional mini-conferences' based upon the
Ballymascanlon ecumenical conference. Daly also wants to see ecumenism
incorporated into education. Interdenominational dialogue must be seen at
every Catholic, public and private school, and especially every seminary.
But Dalys call to action goes beyond interdenominational dialogue.
Churches must also try to change the material realm; in a subsection entitled

Option for the Poor, Daly chastises "complacency and inaction by the Church
in the face of deprivation."40 Christians must come together in denouncing
violence.

''The condemnation of violence by the Churches must be clear,

absolute and total."41 And finally, Daly asserts that any ecumenical initiative
should find its inspiration in the Passion. The bishop warns that ecumenists,
like Christ, will be 'despised and rejected by men.'42 Daly encourages every
37lbid.•

205.

38A fraternal is defined by Daly as a meeting ·for prayer, Bible study and pastoral
"
discussion. • Ibid.
391bld. • 206.
40lbid. , 211.
41 Ibid. , 212.
42lbid.

70
citizen of Northern Ireland to emulate the early Christians and to use the
sufferings caused by the Troubles as an "incentive for conversion, a souce of
hope, and a strength for courage to face the futllre."43 For Daly, the Cross is
the glue that will successfully hold together ecumenical action.

CRITICISMS OF THE PRICE OF PEACE

Objections to this piece of liberation theology are difficult to find.
Daly's work is coherent, insightfut and, for the most part, objective.
Unfortunately, Daly does incorporate certain texts that could significantly
alienate the Protestant reader. Almost every chapter of The Price of Peace is
prefaced with a quote from John Paul II.

Although the quotes are quite

inspirational and religiously neutral, they suggest that Daly values no
opinion more highly than the Vatican's. For the most part, Bishop Daly does
an excellent job of walking the thin line that exists between the two faiths, but
in this case, by omitting lead quotes from any Protestant leaders, he stumbles.

A second criticism can be leveled at his attitude toward politics and
religion. Previous quotes suggest that Daly condemns the intermingling of
the two. This seemingly reactionary view is not exactly what it seems. Daly is
only denouncing the mixing of religion with partisan politics. He states:
God alone is absolute, everything else is relative. To regard political
beliefs as absolute is to absolutise the relative ... It is a form of
idolatry_ It is particularly repugnant to the true genius of
Protestantism. (196)
Still, such an assertion may sound like fundamentalist rhetoric.
repeatedly emphasizes such

43lbid. , 213.

statements~

If Daly

liberal Christians, who are most
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likely to support peace and ecumenical movements, could lose faith in the
bishop.
Thirdly, Daly can be criticized for his naivete. Any religious figure
advocating solutions to a partially political conflict is likely to endure such
complaints.

While denouncing British injustices, Daly brings up an

important point. Internment and Diplock courts only solidify IRA support
and anti-British resentment.

But Daly's solution, Le, freeing convicted

paramilitaries because clemency "is a greater threat to the IRA than harsh
repression"44, suggests not only a degree of sympathy for the IRA, but also a
great deal of Christian idealism. Daly admits that Republican paramilitaries
are largely responsible for the crime and poverty in Catholics ghettos. Freeing
these men from prison might decrease IRA enrollment, but it will not
decrease crime. And anti-British feelings will not begin to disappear until
justice is demonstrated before Catholics are imprisoned.
The fourth and final criticism concerns Daly's use of inspirational
people. In

passin~

Daly mentions Martin Luther King and Gandhi for their

efforts in non-violence.

More often, however, Daly asks the reader to

emulate the pope or Helder Camara and Oscar Romero, two South American
archbishops whom Daly praises for their efforts in combating injustice and
violence. If Daly wishes to truly reach the marginalized of Northern Ireland,
shouldn't he provide these people with an inspirational figure to whom they
can relate? Paddy Hill, one of the Birmingham Six, has given numerous
lectures J denouncing both the British system of justice and the IRA's
campaign of violence. Shane Paul O'Doherty, a former letter bomber for the
'

44lbid. , 142.
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IRA, has now become a vocal peace advocate. The testimony of these people
could only augment Daly's theology of ascent.
Cahal Daly has planted the flag of liberation tehology in downtown
Belfast. The Price of Peace forcefully articulates Daly's concept of a new,
productive, invigorating, yet simple theology for Northern Ireland.

He

beckons all Christians to follow his lead. Daly truly believes that grassroots
ecumenical action, a simple emphasis on Christian love, and a rejection of
violence can make a difference amidst the hopelessness and despair of
Northern Ireland. There can be no denying that Cahal Daly is a liberation
theologian.

CONCLUSION

The conflict in Northern Ireland has become a twisted mess of illogical
arguments, frustrating contradictions and emotional propaganda. Unionists
tenaciously cling to their link with Britain, but they make threats of rebellion any
time Westminster hints at compromising the union. The IRA and INLA fiercely
fight for a unified Ireland, despite the fact that Sinn Fein has only nominal
support in the Republic.

Internment and the Diplock courts have only

strengthened the IRA's enrollment and its propaganda, but the British
government continues to enforce only doctrinaire policies.

Furthermore,

Westminster's enormous welfare checks only heighten stereotypes and,
consequently, drive a wedge between the two communities of Northern Ireland.
The UDA was fonned to protect Ulster Loyalists; today, its priorities seem to be
crime rackets and the killing of random Catholics. Protestant preachers warn of
an impending Catholic theocracy, although "the notion of taking over
responsibility for the IRA and the UDA, for Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley,
understandably appals [sic] Dublin." 1

Because of direct rule, moderate

constitutional parties who seek some sort of middle ground, e.g. the SDLP and
the Alliance party, lack substantial political power. The British people, whose
mandate could truly change the situation in Northern Ireland, are largely
uninformed about Ulster due to strict government controls on the media.
Common sense and logic seem to be among the most glaring casualties of the
Troubles.
'

lMcKiUrick,209,

73

Amid this confusion, there exists a single common denominator. An
overwhelming majority of the people involved in the conflict profess to be
Christians. Over the past four centuries, religion has been partially responsible
for the strife in Northern Ireland; it now has the potential to

tum

the situation

around. As this paper has demonstrated, few British politicians have anything to
gain from trying to tackle Ulster's problems. It is simply impractical for Paisley,
Molyneux and other Unionists to initiate negotiations; their stubbornness toward
the IRA and even constitutional Nationalists, guarantees their popularity. The
IRA has worked itself into a corner with its rhetoric and its actions. In order to
maintain their privileged position in the Catholic community, Republican
paramilitaries are obligated to pursue the 'Cause.' The UDA has found itself in a
similar situation. To reiterate) it seems as if the churches are the only institutions
with the power and commitment to change the minds of the people in Northern
Ireland.
This paper is fueled by optimism. 'Wishful thinking' and 'pipe dream'
are terms that could be used to describe it. After twenty-three years of random
violence and political stonewalling, many people have become exceedingly
cynical about the chances for peace in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, cynicism
does not solve problems. Cahal Daly, on the other hand, has faith in ecumenism
and tolerance. While the theology of The Price of Peace might just be a pipe
dream, Daly should be praised for boldly unraveling the logic of the intransigent
factions in Northern Ireland and robbing them of their legitimacy. It is quite
possible that a great majority of Protestants will reject Daly's ideas simply
because he is a Catholic archbishop. Republicans may brand him a traitor and
Nationalists may scoff at this religious ide~list. But, as I stated earlier, Daly has
at least set the stage for the growth of liberation theology in Northern Ireland. A
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layperson or a group of ecumenical clergy could easily use The Price of Peace as
the base for a more encompassing grassroots theology.
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